July 23 2010

I had the opportunity several weeks ago to speak to the annual meeting of the Society for Conservation Biology in Edmonton at a symposium on “Bridging the Science-Policy Gap in Implementation of Critical Habitat under the ESA and SARA.” I was pleased that a group of conservation scientists reached out to a political scientist interested in the role of science in policy making and the impact of different political institutions on governance and policy.

From my perspective, the underlying problem in this case is the following:  Why don’t governments act to conserve species when science demonstrates significant risks to species viability? There are at least three different kinds of constraints on government action: 

1.       Inadequate science, or inadequate communication of science to policy makers

2.       Political resistance

3.       Institutional design

This post covers the second and especially the third of these three constraints. My bottom line is that inadequate species protection is not a failure of science, or of policy makers’ failure to pay attention to science. It is a failure of policy makers to take actions costly to influential constituents. This failure of political will is in part a characteristic of the policy problem, but can be aggravated by institutional design. The contribution of institutional design to the impact of political motivations can be illustrated by comparing the different laws for the protection of endangered species in Canada and the United States

The Science of Politics

 The first step in understanding the science-policy gap is an awareness of who makes policy decisions: in most cases, it is elected politicians or their direct delegates. One thing we can glean from the “science” of politics, such as it is, is the axiom that politicians are unlikely to take action unless the political benefits of action outweigh the political costs. Policy is made by politicians acting according to political motivations. Conservation biologists, like scientists in other domains, may find this an uncomfortable reality, but it is reality nonetheless. Actions to protect endangered species usually impose costs of some sort, frequently concentrated costs on specific actors whose economic behaviour jeopardizes the species. Unless a politician sees significant political benefits from acting, species protection is likely to be thwarted by resistance from negatively affected interests.

Comparing the ESA and SARA:  Design and Implementation

There are two very significant differences between the US and Canadian federal endangered species acts: the scope and the protective actions forced by the legislation.

Under the US Endangered Species Act, critical habitat is supposed to be designated when the listing decision for a species is made. The ESA provides exceptions under certain circumstances (if critical habitat designation is “‘not prudent’ and ‘not determinable’), but even in those cases there is a hard requirement that it be designated within a year. Agencies have frequently delayed acting, but when challenged, courts have ordered them to act. Once listed, the scope of protection is very broad, preventing “taking habitat” on federal, state, private land.

Since its enactment in 1972, 1375 species have been listed. Recovery plans are in place for 83% of those species, and critical habitat is designated for 43% of them.

Under Canada’s Species at Risk Act, the scope if much narrower and the most critical implementing actions are not covered by time-limited requirements. The listing of a species triggers requirement of the Minister to undertake recovery planning (ss.37-46) and recovery plan implementation (“action planning”) (ss.47-64). The first stage is a more general process. It is only in the “action planning” stage that specific protections for species are implemented. There are specific deadlines on the first “recovery planning” stage. SARA states that recovery plan must include critical habitat “to the extent possible, based on the best available information.”

But here is where the dramatic difference in scope emerges. Critical habitat designation only triggers protection on federal land. The effects of this limitation on scope are quite significant, because unlike the American West, Western Canada has very little federal land. In British Columbia, federal land constitutes only 1%, and it only somewhat higher in Alberta. In contrast, federal land ownership in Alaska is 70%, for Oregon 53%, for Washington 30%, and for California 45%.

Protection on provincial land or private land occurs only through provincial actions as part of the second “action planning” stage, or some other process. And here is where the difference in actions forced by the legislation comes in:  there are no deadlines on action planning. SARA does provide a “safety net” mechanism (Sec. 34) for the federal government to intervene if it determines that “the laws of the province do not effectively protect the species,” but this mechanism in the Act has yet to be used.

The implementation of SARA has been woeful. Agencies have deliberately avoided including critical habitat in recovery plans until the Federal Court has ruled in 2009 that it is illegal not to do so. Recovery planning and critical habitat designation have been very slow. Of the 176 species listed as threatened or endangered prior to SARA coming into full effect in 2003, 40% have recovery strategies, and only 10% have critical habitat identified (Mooers et al 2010). A presentation by Scott Findlay of the University of Ottawa reported more recent results. As of March 2009, for the 322 species currently listed, only 99 (31%) have final recovery strategies. Of those 99 species with final recovery strategies, only 6% had complete critical habitat designation, and an additional 13% has partial critical habitat designated (Findlay et al, “Recovery Strategies and Critical Habitat Identification under Canada’s Species at Risk Act,” under review).

But remember, these actions only directly affect protection on federal land. For the stage of the process that might affect provincial and private land, recovery action planning, there is only one action plan in place in the nation of Canada. That is for the Banff Spring Snail, which exists only in Banff National Park.

The only fully implemented plan under SARA to protect species at risk in Canada is for a snail in a National Park.

The US ESA has been in place much longer than SARA, but the difference in the level of implementation remains striking. The comparative record of the US and Canada suggests that institutional design contributes the divergence in implementation outcomes. In particular, the limited scope of the Canadian Act means that the federal government depends on provincial governments to act. The absence of a legislative deadline for the most important stage of implementation means that reluctant governments, federal or provincial, can get away with inaction. Unless forced by statutory requirements or strong political pressures, governments are unlikely to act to protect endangered species even when the scientific case is strong.

There is currently a Parliamentary Review under way of the Species at Risk Act. This review is an opportunity to strengthen the Act to address the weaknesses of the Act that contribute to this dismal record of implementation.

George Hoberg

Yesterday, the Globe and Mail reported that Bill Bennett, BC’s Minister of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources referred to environmentalists campaigning to turn the Flathead Valley in the southeastern corner of the province into a National Park as “eco-facists” (sic). The minister (who recently replaced Blair Leckstrom who resigned over the HST) explained afterwards that he did not author the email. He stated that it was sent out by a new staffer who was not sufficiently familiar with the office’s review policies.

Even if the Minister was not the author of the email that went out under his name, the incident raises two interesting questions. The first is about the relationship between constituency politics and cabinet duties. Bennett’s portfolio of energy and mines would be directly involved in any decision about the fate of the Flathead. Do cabinet ministers normally engage in such blatant attack politics on issues so close to their portfolio? According to the Vancouver Sun, Bennett apologized for the use of the word fascist (although not, apparently, its misspelling), but not for the content or tone of the message. Here’s an extract from the message reported by the Sun:

“These ‘protectors’ of the earth will use whatever legal, political, dishonest means they can muster. They are like the colonizers of history. They love to add another chunk of their favourite colour to the map of the world. We either stand strong together against the loss of the Flathead Valley to the eco facists [sic], or we will lose the Flathead.”

Even deleting the misspelled f-word, that is pretty harsh rhetoric for someone who needs to have an effective working relationship with the environmental community, not only on the Flathead, but on a broad range of challenging and divisive energy and mining issues facing the province.

The second question raised is whether the email reflects a new rhetorical turn for the BC Government. The email incident got me thinking about some other signature moments in the history of the Government of BC’s rhetoric on environmentalists. In the mid-1990s, when environmentalists launched their campaign to protect the Great Bear

Rainforest, NDP Premier Glen Clark denounced them as “enemies of BC.” That characterization was enormously hurtful to many environmentalists and represented a significant setback in personal and political relations between the government and the environmental community. A decade later, when he announced the government’s plan to protect the Great Bear Rainforest in February 2006, BC Liberal Premier Gordon Campbell shared the stage with

Premier Campbell congratulating the Sierra Club's Lisa Matthaus for her contributions to the Great Bear Rainforest agreement in 2006

leading environmentalists, and during his remarks, he made a deliberate point of referring to leaders of Greenpeace, ForestEthics, and the Sierra Club as his friends and he thanked them for their contributions. While that may have been a rare moment of consensus in a long history of confrontation, I nonetheless understood it to be recognition of the futility and corrosiveness of incendiary political rhetoric from the Government.

That is why I find Bennett’s email so troubling, whether or not it used the f-word and whether or not an inexperienced staffer typed it. It may be a signal of heightened combativeness on behalf of the Government. History has shown that is unproductive politically and environmentally.

Premier Campbell with Brad Bennett, grandson of WAC Bennett

George Hoberg

The Government of British Columbia introduced its much anticipated Clean Energy Act today. The Act follows the government’s increasing assertions about it aspirations to become a “Clean Energy Powerhouse.” To lay the groundwork to pursue that mission, the government appointed a Green Energy Task Force (actually four related bodies) in the Fall of 2009. On April 19, the Government committed to moving the Site C Dam on the Peace River to the regulatory review and environmental assessment stage.

The two most important changes introduced in the Act are a substantial revision of the governance framework for energy policy and the articulation of new and revised objectives for BC energy policy. While these new objectives increase provincial commitments to conservation and clean energy, they also promote electricity exports and fuel-switching that could lead to significant new electricity generation projects . The most glaring gap in the new Act is its failure to explicitly create a regional planning process to address the cumulative effects of energy development.

New Governance Framework. The new governance framework involves two significant changes. First, the Act reunites BC Hydro with the British Columbia Transmission Corporation (BCTC). BCTC was separated from BC Hydro in the Campbell government’s 2002 Energy Plan as part of its effort to privatize new source generation. It was thought at the time that privately owned generating facilities needed access to transmission capacity that was not operated by the Crown utility. But that view has now changed. The effect is to increase the reach and capacity of BC Hydro. Critics of the Campbell government’s energy policies have denounced the creeping privatization of electricity in the province. The new Act does retain a big role for privately-owned independent power producers (IPPs), but reasserts the dominance of government ownership over the bulk of the electricity system.

The second significant change in governance is the substantial reduction in the regulatory jurisdiction of the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC). Most importantly, the Act would remove the authority of the BCUC to approve BC Hydro’s long term plans (currently referred to at a Long Term Acquisition Plan). The Act would create a new planning process – an Integrated Resource Plan - that combines the existing functions of the Long Term Acquisition Plan with the objectives of the “Section 5 Transmission Inquiry.” The government had required the BCUC to conduct that inquiry, but then suspended it when the government decided to appoint the Green Energy Task Forces to recommend how to revise electricity governance. Instead of having the BCUC review and approve the plan, the plan is submitted to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, and then formally approved (or rejected) by the cabinet in the form of the Lieutenant Governor in Council (Sections 3 and 4 of the Act).

In addition to removing the BCUC from planning, the new Act would also remove the BCUC from the review and approval of major projects, including the proposed Site C dam, new export agreements, the Northwest Transmission Line, additions of new turbines to existing “heritage” dams, the 2008 Clean Power Call, and the new Smart Meter program. The BCUC would retain authority mainly over rate setting.

In July 2009, the BCUC took the controversial action of rejecting outright BC Hydro’s Long Term Acquisition Plan, including its proposal to reduce reliance on the Burrard Thermal natural gas plant that the government was trying to phase out. With the new Clean Energy Act, the BCUC won’t be acting as a referee any longer between BC Hydro and the government. This is a dramatic shift in the governance of electricity policy from regulation by an independent commission to direct government control.

New and Revised Objectives.  The Campbell government made substantial changes to energy policy with both its 2002 and 2007 Energy Plans, much of which was explicitly incorporated in legislation through the Utilities Commission Act. The new Clean Energy Act carries forward many of those objectives but also adds new objectives and strengthens some important existing objectives.

·         The most significant new objective is “to be a net exporter of electricity…with the intention of benefitting all British Columbians and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in regions in which British Columbia trades electricity.” Previously, the core objective had been self-sufficiency. This new export objective embodies BC’s aspiration to become a “Clean Energy Powerhouse,” and could lead to substantial new development of energy projects.

·         The new Act would also “encourage the switching of one kind of energy source or use to another that decreases  greenhouse gas emissions in British Columbia.” Fuel switching from gasoline to electricity in the transportation sector and from natural gas to electricity in the building sector could have substantial implications for BC’s future electricity demand.

·         The Act would strengthen the obligation to meet new electricity demand through conservation measures from 50% to 66%. In its most recent planning proposal BC Hydro wanted to rely on conservation for 72%, so this seems readily achievable.

·         The Act would increase the required percentage of electricity generated from clean or renewable sources from 90% to 93%

Glaring Omission. Perhaps the most glaring omission from the new Clean Energy Act is the absence of an explicit requirement for a regional planning process to address the cumulative effects of energy development. The environmental community has persistently criticized the BC government for its lack of effective planning for new energy developments. The province dealt reasonably effectively with forest land use issues through the Land and Resource Management Planning process, but those plans did not include energy for the most part. Recommendations to include energy in a similar planning process have been proposed by a broad coalition of environmental groups in a submission to the Green Energy Task Forces. The task force on “resource development” included very specific recommendations for a new process under its Outcome 3 “Achieve world-class environmental performance for clean energy

Projects”:

1. [omitted]

2. By September 30, 2010, and using existing data and information layers, develop a renewable energy zoning map for the Province that identifies where development of renewable energy and transmission is appropriate and inappropriate.

3. Complete the Section 5 inquiry as soon as possible, focusing on transmission planning and deferring all regional planning submissions to the regional planning process.

4. Using the outcomes of the provincial zoning map (recommendation 2) and Section 5 findings  (recommendation 3), undertake regional planning in areas that are appropriate for more intensive development, have potential for industry electrification, and have potential for low cost energy clusters.  An assessment of cumulative impacts of all projects within the planning area will also take place.

Recommendation number 3 seems to have been included in the new Integrated Resource Plan, but the other two recommendations have not been explicitly incorporated into the new Clean Energy Act . The section on planning does contain a reference to a requirement to consider, as part of its transmission planning, “an assessment of the potential for developing…grouped by geographic area, electricity generation from clean or renewable resources in British Columbia.” This provision does require the sort of regional supply planning envisioned the Section 5 Transmission Inquiry Terms of Reference. But it does not explicitly address the issue of cumulative effects from multiple energy projects that has been the prime concern of the environmental community and that was clearly recommended by the Green Energy Task Force on Resource Development.

The Act does make homage to cumulative effects by amending the Environmental Assessment Act to allow the consideration of “potential cumulative environmental effects.” This is not actually a significant change because the Environmental Assessment Office had already committed (p. 26) to considering cumulative effects. More importantly, tweaking the environmental assessment process does not get at the root of the problem of moving beyond project-level assessment to considering integrated regional planning.

As debate over the new Act begins, it will be important to hear the government’s response to the strong Green Energy Task Force recommendations on regional planning. Given that a shift to an export focus and fuel-switching will increase the pressure for new energy projects, it is imperative that we get the review and approval process right.

Other Notable Changes. If enacted the new Clean Energy Act would also do the following:

·         Create a new feed-in tariff

·         Create a First Nations Clean Energy Business Fund

·         Formally legislative a “Two Rivers Policy” which precludes any new major dams in the province after Site C.

March 17, 2010

Updated statistics compiled by BC Stats on electricity trade are now available for 2009, providing additional evidence that BC has moved into a situation of being a net importer of electricity.

In the continuing controversy over BC electricity policy, the question of whether the province is a net importer or exporter continues to play a surprisingly large role. In a recent comment on BC’s self-sufficiency policy, NDP energy critic John Horgan claimed that the government has created an artificial panic over the need for new power. He states: “Over the last eight years, B.C. has been a net exporter of electricity.” In response, Energy Minister Blair Lekstrom states “Many British Columbians are surprised to learn that BC Hydro is a net importer of electricity to keep our lights on. Despite what Horgan would have you believe, BC Hydro has imported more electricity than it has exported in eight of the last 10 years.” Given that data on trade flows, while complicated, are readily available, this persistent factual disagreement is perplexing.

We attempted to sort through some the methodological and conceptual issues involved in a post last year. The biggest difference underlying the apparently conflicting claims is whether one is examining just BC Hydro or the entire province – there are electricity producers in the province other than BC Hydro. But even that can’t account for Horgan’s mistaken interpretation of the situation.

In 2009, the province consumed 5.8% more electricity than it produced. This means that BC was a net importer of electricity for four out of the past six years. There are many important and challenging issues in BC electricity policy. We should save our intellectual and political energy for a reasoned discussion of them, and move beyond the false debate about whether BC is a net importer or exporter.

A table and chart are included below with a summary of the data. The trade data is reported at BC Stats. The data on BC generation and consumption were provided directly to me by BC Stats.

Canada's Environment Minister, Jim Prentice

February 4, 2010

On January 30, Canada’s Minister of Environment, Jim Prentice, finally announced the country’s commitment to greenhouse gas mitigation under the Copenhagen Accord. Its target for 2020 is a 17 percent reduction below 2005 levels. In a speech at the University of Calgary on February 1, Prentice provided a spirited justification for this target. While it is certainly welcome news that Canada has made a formal commitment to reduce greenhouse gases under the Copenhagen Accord, the target and the government’s justification for it are troubling.

1. Weakening. The new target represents a weakening of the previously stated government target of 20% below 2006 levels; 2020 emissions would be 6% higher under the new target than the old. Canada’s GHG emissions actually declined between 2005 and 2006, so not only is the per cent reduction lower but it is from a lower base.

2. Abrogation of climate policy sovereignty. The text of the Canadian submission is also remarkable because it explicitly ties Canada’s commitment to the actions of another country, the United States. Canada’s formal target is a 17% reduction by 2020 “to be aligned with the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in enacted legislation.” Since the election of Barack Obama, the Harper government has abandoned its “made in Canada” approach and advocated harmonization with a North American regime with American leadership. In his Calgary speech, Prentice reinforced and extended this message: “Our determination to harmonize our climate change policy with that of the United States also extends beyond greenhouse gas emission targets: we need to proceed even further in aligning our regulations…[W]e will only adopt a cap-and-trade regime if the United States signals that it wants to do the same. Our position on harmonization applies equally to regulation… Canada can go down either road—cap-and-trade or regulation—but we will go down neither road alone.”

I am not naïve about the challenges Canada confronts as a small, open economy adjacent to the world’s largest economy – a substantial fraction of my academic work (e.g., Sleeping with an Elephant and Capacity for Choice) has been about this challenge. But I can never recall such a blatant and resolute proclamation that Canadian policy will be dictated by American policy.

3. Distortion. In his Calgary speech, Prentice showed his Harper Conservative credentials by ridiculing his critics with distorted facts. He mocked the opposition by pointing to their private members’s bill, Bill C-311, which he claimed “proposed a 40 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels.” But the bill calls for 25%, not 40%, reduction below 1990 levels. He attacked the Province of Quebec, a vocal critic of the federal government’s inaction on climate, for its new vehicle emission standards: “Let’s be clear: It’s absolutely counter-productive and utterly pointless for Canada and Canadian businesses to strike out on their own, to set and to pursue targets that will ultimately create barriers to trade and put us at a competitive disadvantage. One of the most glaring examples of the folly of attempting to go it alone in an integrated North American economy is the new, and unique, vehicle regulations introduced by Quebec. These ensure that consumers will basically have to leave that province to buy their vehicles, to avoid levies of up to five thousand dollars, because seventy-five percent of the latest car and truck models don’t conform to the new rules.”

His claim that the policy would increase the cost of a car by up to $5000 is, according to Quebec regulatory officials, a significant distortion. And while Quebec may have moved ahead of the federal government, it is hardly striking out on its own: According to a story in the Financial Post, Quebec has adopted the same standards as California and 14 Northeastern US states neighbouring Quebec. British Columbia is also adopting them. (And, oddly, even the federal government of Canada is planning to adopt them shortly.) Undoubtedly, regulatory diversity has a cost when product markets are highly integrated. This divergence has emerged in North America because the federal government in both countries have been much slower to respond to the climate imperative than subnational jurisdictions.

4. Lack of Preparation. Prentice also exaggerated his government’s preparation in moving forward with climate policy if the United States does act. In stating that his government could harmonize with either a US regulatory or cap and trade approach, he stated that “We’ve already completed much of the extensive analysis and consultation work required to prepare us for both of those options.” It is reasonable to say that the government has performed extensive analysis and consultation regarding the regulatory approach reflected in its “Turning the Corner” Regulatory Framework for Industrial GHG Emissions. That approach, however, is unlikely to be able to achieve Canada’s target, among other reason because it is designed on the basis of intensity targets rather than any broader emissions cap. But the government has not proposed, analyzed, or consulted widely about a cap and trade approach. (Or if it has, it is secret.)

It is precisely this vacuum in policy formulation that produced the surprisingly heated conflict over an analysis commissioned by several environmental groups about the impacts of a realistic mix of policy instruments to meet the government’s prior “20% by 2020” target. Yes, the US Congressional process is notoriously slow. But the stunning lack of progress in Canada in designing a serious greenhouse gas reduction policy creates a real risk that Canada will be completely unprepared if the US finally gets its climate act together. Among other things, Canada will need to address the delicate issues around the oil sands and the related challenges around regional burden sharing. A meaningful national dialogue on climate policy design is long overdue.

In their book Hot Air, Simpson, Jaccard, and Rivers conclude with an 8-point “smell test” on whether or not politicians are serious about their commitment to climate action. Number 1 on the list is “If targets are proposed, but the politicians setting them do not detail how they will be reached, assume failure.” Canada has now revised its target and formalized it in a UN commitment. But it has no plan on how to achieve that target, and no process to develop a plan.

5. A Superpower without Sovereignty. In his Calgary speech, Prentice also chose to talk tough about the oil sands. In surprisingly strong language, he spoke of the need to improve the image of the oil sands or “we will be cast as a global poster child for environmentally unsound resource development.” To avoid that fate, Prentice stated that “we need to up our game, in terms of both environmental vigilance and in terms of our communication efforts.” While such commitments are welcome from Canada’s environment minister, the federal government thus far has done virtually nothing to address the environmental problems of the oil sands, and Prentice did not mention any new plans or initiatives. His statements on oil sands would thus fail Hot Air’s smell test number 1 as well.

In urging action to improve the reputation of the oil sands, Prentice revived Harper’s notion of Canada as a “clean energy superpower.” Harper Initially proposed the concept of Canada as an emerging “energy superpower” in a 2006 speech in London. The notion was dismantled by academics shortly thereafter – Canada does not have the economic and political means and will to be an energy superpower. When the “clean” adjective was added, the notion became even more farfetched. While Canada might have vast potential to export hydroelectricity, the geopolitical clout it does have is with its vast reserves in the oil sands. Barring unforeseen technological advances, it is hard to imagine how the oil sands will be able to legitimately claim status as clean energy.

Indeed, it is quite remarkable that Prentice could claim that Canada aspires to being a superpower of any kind at the same time as he abandons Canada’s climate policy sovereignty by tethering Canada’s climate actions to American policies in its Copenhagen Accord commitment.

The Up Side. There is a potential bright side to how the Harper Conservatives have positioned Canada on climate. Their submission to the Copenhagen Accord validates that international process and will increase moral pressure on Canada to act. More important, if the US does enact climate legislation, the pressure on Canada to follow suit will be immense. The Harper government may be hoping the Obama’s climate efforts will be stymied. But if not, they will be hard pressed not to live up to their commitments, and will have significant political cover to address the opponents to climate action in Alberta.

George Hoberg and Stephanie Taylor

January 12, 2010 (with February 2, 2010 updates)

Canada has committed to reduce greenhouse gases by 20% below 2006 levels by 2020. The federal government has yet to release any credible plan for meeting those targets or an analysis of what the impacts of meeting those targets would be. In this policy and analytical vacuum, NGOs and think tanks have begun to put forward policy scenarios and cost estimates. The most prominent analysis was that released by the Pembina Institute and the David Suzuki Foundation (DSF) in October 2009, which prompted a strong backlash from politicians and the media.  Alberta Premier Ed Stelmach characterized the policy proposal as nothing more than a regional wealth transfer, saying “there won’t be another wealth transfer to Ottawa under my watch. There’s already one wealth transfer program and that’s equalization.” The National Post editorial board went further, arguing that “such an effort would shake the very pillars of Confederation.” The Canada West Foundation (CWF) joined the criticism, stating that the disproportionate burden to be borne by Alberta and Saskatchewan made the policy scenarios unfair and doomed to failure. Of the Pembina/DSF report, the CWF states that “[t]ough luck is the message we are hearing, and this is not only unfair but counterproductive in terms of implementing effective climate change policy in Canada” (p. 16).

(February 2 update:) The CWF expanded upon this point in a January 2010 report, in which they emphasized the negative economic effects for the rest of the country if the West were to bear a disproportionate burden of carbon emissions reductions: “the western Canadian economy is critically important to the rest of the national economy [emphasis theirs]… Hence, if the oil and gas sector that underpins so much of the western economy is hamstrung by policies aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, the whole country will suffer” (p. 4).

Background on Regional Equity in the Canadian Federation

In a federation such as Canada, regional equity issues are inevitable, and much of Canadian political history has been about how to address them. The most obvious example is equalization payments made through the federal Equalization Program, which seeks to maintain a roughly equal level of government services across the country by transferring federal money to poorer provinces. Equalization payments are determined by taking the difference between a province’s revenue-raising capacity and the average revenue-raising capacity of all provinces. Another example would be Employment Insurance payments to citizens, for which eligibility is tied to a province’s unemployment rate. Both examples are the subject of much dispute by provinces.

Given the vastly different natural resource endowments of provinces, and the effect that these natural resources have on provincial economies, the federal government has sought to include resource revenues in equalization payment calculations. However, a series of exemptions previously shielded nearly all of this natural resource-derived provincial revenue from inclusion in the calculations. As a result, despite all the heated rhetoric emanating from the province, Alberta’s vast resource wealth has not historically been included directly in the equalization formula.  In the 2007 budget, a new equalization formula was introduced, in which 50% of natural resource revenues would be included in the equalization formula. This angered Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, both of which had signed offshore oil and gas development agreements with the federal government that excluded their offshore resources from inclusion in their equalization calculations. As a result, the federal government gave all provinces the choice of adopting the new formula or retaining the previous formula, which effectively shielded natural resource revenues from inclusion in the equalization formula.

Regional Equity Implications of Climate Policy

Climate policy figures prominently in considerations of regional equity as well. Just as different provinces have different natural resource endowments, they also have different greenhouse gas emissions (which are often tied to their natural resources). The most affected provinces are those whose economies are disproportionately dependent on fossil fuels, namely Alberta and Saskatchewan.  As a result, these provinces would be expected to achieve greater greenhouse gas emission reductions than the rest of the country. Because the policy instruments under consideration – a carbon tax or a cap and trade system* – would create new revenue flows to the federal government, some Westerners are concerned that a regional wealth transfer between the West and the East will result. (February 2 update:) Others, such as the CWF, are concerned that the opposite will occur – that the negative economic impacts of GHG reduction policies in the West (namely in the oil sands) will infect the rest of the country, bringing with it a painful economic malaise.

Serious climate policies do not necessarily result in a regional transfer of wealth, however. It depends on how they are designed. In particular, regional distributional consequences of climate action would be strongly influenced by how the carbon-based government revenues were allocated by governments.

For example, even the controversial Pembina Institute and DSF analysis proposed that a portion of the revenue from carbon pricing go toward payments to individuals to compensate for regional variations in household energy cost increases (Albertans would receive the highest payments - p. 9) and payments to certain manufacturing sectors (such as mineral mining and metal smelting)  to ensure that output levels would not drop below 2008 levels. But most of the new revenues in their policy scenarios were used to reduce personal income tax rates. That policy has many advantages, but it would have a less direct impact on the regional distribution of economic activity. If regional balancing was considered more important than income tax reduction, the mix of fiscal policies for allocating the carbon revenues could be changed to emphasize those that put a greater emphasis on differential costs of compliance or some other relevant factor.

A valuable December 2009 report by Snoddon and Wigle for the Institute for Research on Public Policy went further. They model a policy scenario where all carbon tax revenues are allocated back to provinces in proportion to their initial emissions, and then allows the provinces to decide how to allocate the revenue. In their model, because of revenue recycling, Alberta and Saskatchewan are actually better off after the climate policy is put in place (p. 11).

The regional impacts of climate policies are not inevitable and they are certainly not something generated by a modelling exercise commissioned by environmental groups. They are policy design choices made by governments.

Conclusion: We Need Real Dialogue Now

Addressing the climate crisis will result in increased costs to consumers and producers; as we move to internalize the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, this outcome is inevitable. These costs will only increase the longer it takes for policy to be implemented. As the Pembina/DSF analysis made clear, economic growth is still possible, even in the hardest hit provinces under their policy scenario. Under their assumptions, growth will be reduced from business-as-usual levels, but it is still robust economic growth. It is true that there will be a change in the regional redistribution of costs and benefits of carbon-intensive economic activities. But this does not need to lead to the type of tax revenue grab that many Westerners fear. To the extent that we wish to limit regional impacts we have a range of fiscal policy tools to do so, such as decentralized revenue recycling and even broader policies like the Equalization Program.

Given the urgency of the climate change problem, it is necessary for Canada to have a reasoned debate about how to address the regional impacts of climate policy. We may decide that some degree of regional redistribution is a good idea because the economy will need to adjust to pricing carbon. But if we choose to minimize the regional implications of the policy, there are policy tools available to do that.  There is no doubt that such a debate will be a significant challenge to the federation, but it is hardly an insurmountable obstacle to climate policy.  What is most critical is that this debate begin immediately so that we can make progress on developing and implementing a climate policy in a timely fashion. Perhaps, like Nixon in China, our Conservative Albertan Prime Minister is ideally placed to begin this debate. If he continues to refuse to exercise constructive leadership on this issue, civil society will need step forward to facilitate this dialogue.

* A cap and trade system would not necessarily generate government revenues. Government revenues would be available if allowances were auctioned off, as many economists would prefer. However, it is also possible to distribute allowances for free, as the bill passed in the US House would do. Free granting of allowances based on current or historical emissions is another policy tool available to address the distributional consequences of climate policy.

November 9, 2009

Hansen at a coal mining protest, where he was arrested.

Four Models of Scientists and Politics

The literature on advocacy in science and policy contains four models: traditional, science communication, expert advocacy, and political advocacy. An overview of these models helps to evaluate Hansen’s actions as a scientist and advocate, providing a revealing case study of the implications and consequences of science advocacy.  

The traditional model separates science from politics with the expectation that scientists should put forth objective data when pertinent without further involvement in the policy process (Lach et al, 2003).  This model suggests Hansen should remain strictly within his area of research, as he did for a significant portion of his career.

A second model, science communication, acknowledges the distinction between science and politics but implies that scientists should do more then simply hand off their data. They should be interpreting and explaining their findings to both policy makers and the public. After all, they are often on the leading edge of knowledge in their respective areas (Mills and Clark, 2001). Hansen, on the fore front of knowledge in climatology and modeling, made a well-known appeal to a Congressional committee in 1988 to take acknowledge the reality of global warming and take the threat of climate change seriously. This appeal included results of his research and future climate projections, falling under this model of science communication.

The expert advocacy model is based on the belief that scientists should be involved by communicating their research with an ethical obligation to act as advocates (Mills and Clark,  2001).  Advocacy in this form is defined as the process of informing policy makers, managers, and the general public about issues that arise in one’s area of expertise (Brussard and Tull, 2007). Dr. Hansen’s research has led him to believe that 350 parts per million (ppm) is the safe limit for atmospheric carbon dioxide, and therefore should be acknowledged in emissions reduction policies. The acceptable limit was previously thought by many scientists to be in the range of 450 ppm. Hansen, with help from others, has communicated this perceived quantity for target atmospheric CO₂ to policy makers and the public. His findings have been recognized and well received by some, spawning new global initiatives for climate action. This model holds that scientists are qualified to be involved in decision-making processes, but it deems advocacy for specific policy preferences as inappropriate (Lackey, 2006).

Under the final model, which we call political advocacy, a scientist advocates a position beyond their core are of scientific expertise. In this case, according to Lackey, the arguments “ sound like science, read like science, are presented by people who cloak   themselves in the accouterments of science but who are actually offering nothing but policy advocacy masquerading as science” (Lackey, 2006, p. 15).

Hansen’s recent activities definitely reflect this concept of political advocacy.  His political advocacy is evident in his participation in coal-related protests in Washington and West Virginia; references to coal plants as  “death factories”; an appearance in a UK court to testify on behalf of climate activists; letters to Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the Obamas and the Government of Australia stating his position on climate change, necessary emissions reductions and policy recommendations. Hansen has controversially opposed the Waxman-Markey Bill and presented his own policy suggestions such as carbon taxation instead of cap and trade. Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change speaks on Hansen’s policy suggestions:  “I wish he would stick to what he really knows because I don’t think he has a realistic view of what is politically possible, or what the best policies would be to deal with this problem” (Kolbert, 2009, p. 44). Claussen is pointing the distinction between expert advocacy and political advocacy. Hansen’s expertise makes him well positioned to advocate a safe level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but he is not an acknowledged authority on the relative merits of climate policy instruments or on the political process.

Advocacy and Credibility

Underlying all of these models is the inherent risk of credibility loss, which significantly increases the farther scientists move away from the traditional model and from their area of expertise. Although Hansen has been recognized as a highly respected scientist for decades it appears that his venture into the political realm has tarnished his credibility as a research scientist. This change is exemplified by the controversy over Hansen as the 2009 recepient of American Meteorological Society’s highest honor, The Carl-Gustaf Rossby Research Medal.  Specifically, this controversy surrounded the public communication component of the award and the argument that Hansen conforms scientific data to his political opinions. In Hansen’s defense it could be argued that, conversely, his science has shaped his political views. Even if true, Hansen’s credibility as a scientist still suffers.

Credibility within the science community is critically important as its loss can compromise the utilization of research results (Aycrigg et al. 2006) and jeopardize the important contributions that science can offer to policy decisions (Pielke 2004). It is recognized that “science, politics and policy are inextricably connected” (Pielke, 2004, p. 406) and for this reason it is important for scientists like Hansen to move beyond the traditional model and communicate their science to policy makers and the public. Yet, the higher risks to credibility associated with political advocacy may be too great as they can compromise the contribution of potentially important research in policy-relevant issues.

Print Sources

Aycrigg, J.L., G.R. Feldman, R.T. Lackey, A.B. Pidgorna, D.A. Rupp, J.M. Scott, D.I. Stanish, and R.K. Steinhorst. 2006. “Policy advocacy in science: prevalence, perspectives, and implications for conservation biologists.” Conservation Biology 21: 29-35

Bowen, Mark. 2008. Censoring Science: Global Warming and the Political Attack on Dr. James Hansen. New York: Penguin.

Brussard, P. F. and J. C. Tull. 2007. “Conservation biology and four types of advocacy.” Conservation Biology 21: 21-24

Kolbert, Elizabeth. 2009. “The Catastrophist.” The New Yorker.  29 June 2009. p. 39-45

Lach, D.L., P.C List, B.S. Steel, and B.A. Shindler. 2003. “Advocacy and credibility of ecological scientists in resource decionmaking: a regional study.” Bioscience 53(2): 170-178

Lackey, R. T. 2007. “Science, scientists and policy advocacy.” Conservation Biology 21: 12-17

Mills, T. J. 2000. Position advocacy by scientists risks science credibility and may be unethical. Northwest Science 74(2): 165- 168

Mills, T. J. and R. N. Clark. 2001. Roles of research scientists in natural resource decision-making. Forest Ecology and Management 153: 189-198

Pielke, R.A. 2004. “When scientists politicize science: making sense of controversy over the skeptical environmentalist.” Environmental Science and Policy 7: 405-417 

George Hoberg and Stephanie Taylor

October 30, 2009

This week the Pembina Institute and the David Suzuki Foundation jointly released a report that finds that Canada can meet its greenhouse gas emissions reduction target – and even more stringent goals – without bringing the economy to a halt. While acknowledging that the policies necessitated by emissions reduction targets will have different effects for different provinces, the report emphasizes that the impact on economic growth for even the most carbon-intensive provinces will be relatively modest.

As expected, the report has prompted hyperbolic responses from the defenders of Canada’s fossil energy establishment:  several Western provinces, federal Minister of the Environment Jim Prentice, and the Globe and Mail editorial board. Prentice characterized the report’s findings as “irresponsible” and stressed that Canada could meet its targets through other means, namely by harmonizing its climate change plan with the United States’ as-yet-unfinalized plan. He also made it clear that the costs of any emissions reduction plan must be acceptable to all regions of the country. Such agreement over an effective climate action plan is all but impossible as long as Alberta refuses to “touch the brake” on its oil sands operations. And even before factoring in provincial reactions, such hyperbole coming from the federal Minister of the Environment casts doubt on the sincerity of Canada’s commitment to its own greenhouse gas emission reduction target by 2020.

Politicians from Alberta and Saskatchewan were even more vocal in their opposition to the report. Alberta premier Ed Stelmach denounced the report’s recommendations as nothing more than a wealth transfer to other parts of the country: “There won’t be another wealth transfer to Ottawa under my watch. There is already one wealth transfer program and that’s equalization.” Saskatchewan Energy Minister Bill Boyd echoed Stelmach’s “wealth transfer” theme, adding that technology is the key to combating climate change. Alberta and Saskatchewan have placed large amounts of faith and money in carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, despite questions surrounding its reliability and cost-effectiveness. Recently the federal government has joined in, pumping $343-million into a CCS-equipped coal-fired generation plant in Wabamun, Alberta while declaring that “Carbon capture and storage has the potential to help us balance our need for energy with our duty to protect the environment.”

This dismissive and defiant rhetoric is part of a long history of resistance and denial that at some point Canada, and especially Alberta, would need to reconcile its energy and climate policies with modern notions of sustainability and, especially, an evolving international climate regime. The ghost of the National Energy Program has given Western provinces a de facto veto over national climate change policy.

National newspapers joined the condemnation. The lead Globe and Mail editorial yesterday denounced the report:  “its all-out attack on the oil and gas sector is politically and economically unacceptable, and would euthanize a vital Canadian industry.” It says the report’s policy recommendations are “unsaleable and dangerous.” In its most extreme rhetoric, it proclaims “Canada cannot take its national unity for granted and must not, in the service of international obligations, allow itself to be immolated by a government policy of such wrenching dislocation.”  The National Post editorial board joined in the hyperbole, rejecting the report because it “would shake the very pillars of Confederation.” A National Post commentary joined the editorial excess, claiming “there will be blood.” Reactions from farther west are not so shrill. Vancouver Sun columnist Craig McInnes claims the report demonstrates that “with a political will, there’s a way.”

The Report

Pembina and DSF enlisted MK Jaccard and Associates (MKJA) to consider the feasibility and cost of two greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets: 1) a 25 percent reduction below 1990 levels by 2020, as proposed by environmental NGOs (ENGOs), and 2) a 20 percent reduction below 2006 levels by 2020, the Canadian government’s proposed target. Both scenarios were found to be feasible, though only with significantly stricter policy packages than those proposed thus far by the provincial and federal governments. Of particular interest are the carbon dioxide equivalent emissions prices under each scenario: $50/tonne in 2010 rising to $200/tonne in 2020 under the ENGO scenario, and $40/tonne in 2010 with an increase to $100/tonne in 2020 given the government’s target.

Unfortunately, even the stringent policy packages proposed by MKJA (including carbon pricing) are not enough to reach the emissions reduction targets in either scenario.  Thus, the policy package examined by the authors includes purchasing of international offsets, pursuit of carbon capture and storage (for the environmental option), and a number of other policy responses to close the gap.

Economic Impacts:  National and Regional

Under both scenarios, the report projects that Canada will experience significant economic growth, but not quite as much as it would under the “business as usual” (BAU) scenario of no new controls. Under the BAU scenario, Canadian GDP is projected to grow 27% by 2020. Under the scenario implementing the Government of Canada’s target, GDP would grow 25% by 2020, and under the environmental group target scenario, GDP would grow 22%. The changes in GDP growth are projected to have different affects on different provinces. Growth will be less than projected under BAU in all regions except Manitoba and Ontario. The gap between GDP under both policy scenarios and under BAU is by far the largest in Alberta at 8% under the government scenario and 12 percent under the ENGO scenario.

The number of jobs will increase between 2010 and 2020 in all provinces. Interestingly, job growth will exceed business as usual (BAU) levels under both scenarios in BC, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. Alberta is the sole province to whose job growth is less than BAU levels under both scenarios, though it is important not to confuse reduced job growth with negative job growth. Pre-tax salaries in 2020 will also continue to grow under both scenarios, but at a slower rate than under BAU in all regions except Manitoba, which grows faster than under BAU.

GDP per capita will continue to grow in all regions under both climate policy scenarios, though the change from BAU levels will be greatest under the ENGO scenario. Under BAU, Alberta would see per capita GDP growth of 42%, as opposed to 25% under the ENGO scenarios and 31%under the government scenario. As the authors point out, this model does not account for the effects of population growth on GDP per capita. Specifically, population growth in Alberta is likely to be lower under both policy scenarios than under BAU (due to a relative decrease in expected energy sector jobs), which will lead to higher GDP per capita numbers than those projected under the policy scenarios. 

Conclusion

 As the report clearly shows, effective climate action is possible in Canada without plunging the country, or even the Western provinces, into economic chaos. The report’s authors should be congratulated for advancing the climate policy debate in Canada. By conducting serious economic policy analysis on what needs to be done to significantly reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions, they have spoken truth to power. In so doing, however, they’ve exposed the hypocrisy of Canada’s persistent claims that it is committed to emission reduction targets without having a plan or the political will to do meet those targets. By being transparent about the regional impacts of climate policies, the report also challenges the foundation of political-economic power in the West, and provoked a formidable rhetorical backlash.

If Canada wants to be a responsible member of the international community, it will need to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, and do so significantly and relatively quickly. This cannot be done without significantly raising the cost of energy production from fossil fuels, including the oil sands as well as coal and natural gas. The Canadian economy will need to adjust to these changes, and the impacts of these costs will have differential impact on regions, just as the regional endowment of fossil energy and the wealth generated from that has had differential impacts on regions. The fact that some areas in Western Canada will not grow as much as they might otherwise cannot be used as a justification for failing to act on our generation’s greatest challenge.

George Hoberg

October 15, 2009

Today is Blog Action Day for climate, and we at GreenPolicyProf wanted to add our support.

We’ve been blogging about climate action issues over the past year. Our analysis of the political dilemma of climate action shows why a massive political mobilization is necessary to change the political behavior of the politicians who are making the critical decisions about climate policy. We emphasize the political dilemma that the costs of action are here, now, and relatively certain, but the benefits of action are global, distant in time, and highly uncertain. To internalize the externalities created by greenhouse gas emitting activities, politicians have to raise energy prices, imposing costs on voters and powerful interest groups.  Yet politicians have been reluctant to do so, because the benefits are globally diffused, long term, and highly uncertain. They won’t take action unless they are forced to by political pressure.

We see particular hope in youth action on climate change. In our post on the emerging youth climate movement, we argue that a youth movement promises to reshape the temporal, inter-generational component of the dilemma. If a youth movement could succeed in making adults place greater weight on the consequences of their actions (and inactions) for children, it would prove to be powerful political catalyst for meaningful climate action in Copenhagen and beyond.

350.org and many affiliated organizations are working to create a massive event on October 24. Here is an opportunity to demonstrate to politicians that there is massive public support for vigorous climate action. Please get out and participate in your local event. And if you have them, take your kids with messages designed to reframe the thinking of adults – politicians but also all polluters — to focus on the consequences for their kids and grandkids of their inaction.

 Our local event in Vancouver is Bridge to a Cool Planet, starting on the Cambie Bridge at noon. I hope to see you there!

October 12, 2009

GreenPolicyProf wants to send a major shoutout to Elinor Ostrom, the co-winner of this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics.

Ostrom’s award is notable for several reasons. First, she is the first woman to win the prize in economics. Second, while a number of previous Nobel prize winners were given their awards for their contributions to the understanding of political behavior (e.g., Buchanan), she is the first recipient of the economic prize to actually be a political scientist by training.

Most importantly, she was given the award for her contributions to governance for sustainability. Her most influential work has explored the conditions under which local users of natural resources can develop effective mechanisms for ensuring sustainability. According to the Nobel committee,

Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote successful outcomes.

The Nobel committee’s provides descriptions of her work designed for the public and for specialists,