This letter was submitted to the Sun today:

Your February 26 editorial relied heavily on a study that concluded that divestment from fossil fuels would not have a significant impact on the “carbon shadow” of UBC’s endowment. Unfortunately, that study significantly underestimates the impact of divestment.

The renewable firms the authors used to assess the impact of reinvestment turn out to be outliers. Using average renewable firms yields a 90% reduction of the carbon footprint of the fossil fuel component of UBC’s endowment, not 22%. (Technical critique here.)

The study compares investments based on firms’ emissions only to the point of sale. For a solar panel producer, that approximates emissions over the product’s full life cycle. For fossil fuels companies the PICS study excludes the vast majority of emissions, which occur when those fuels are burned by consumers. The moral justification for divestment lies in the much larger differences over the full life-cycle that are not captured by the study’s methods.

If we are to live in a world with a safe climate system, “the vast majority of [fossil fuel] reserves are unburnable,” Bank of England Governor Mark Carney recently warned. UBC should not fund its students’ education by investing in industries whose products inevitably harm their future.

Kathryn Harrison, Political Science, UBC
George Hoberg, Forest Resources Management, UBC

This guide is intended for the students in my energy policy classes but I wanted to make it more widely available. You can find it here.

There is widespread evidence that the American public’s belief in climate change is declining. The existence, immediacy and seriousness of climate change have all been called into question, with a Gallup poll in 2010 showing that only 50% of Americans surveyed believe that humans are affecting climate change, opposed to 61% in 2007.

This decline plays a crucial role in how governments react to climate change, as elected politicians care about what people think. If public opinion is showing a trend towards a disbelief in climate science, this could be an important factor in discouraging political action. A recent paper, “Fair Weather Friends,” by Lyle Scruggs and Salil Benegal from the University of Connecticut’s Department of Political Science, tries to tease out an explanation for these trends.

The authors identify three competing explanations for this decline: media and conservative counter-mobilization, weather anomalies, and the economic recession. While all these factors have an affect on how the public perceives climate change, their analysis concludes that the state of the economy is the cause that has the most weight in shifting public opinion.

1. Media and Conservative Counter-Mobilization

Scruggs and Benegal provide a detailed examination of how media bias influences climate coverage, and the concerted campaign by conservatives to discredit climate science. They review arguments that the media’s tendency to report opposing views on an issue has the consequence of misrepresenting the pervasive consensus on climate science. But they note that loudly voiced views that attack climate science started in the early to mid 1990’s, while the public seemed to increasingly embrace climate science until 2007-2008.

They also focus on “climategate,” the notorious instance of hacked emails appearing to discredit climate science. There is a widespread belief that this faux scandal had damaging impacts on the public’s belief in climate science. But the paper examines the sequence of events and points out the revealing fact that the drop in belief in opinion polls ­preceded the November 2009 climategate incident. A widely report Pew poll shows a significant drop in an October 2009 survey.

2. Weather Anomalies

Several studies show that people tend to believe more in global warming if they think recent temperatures are higher than normal. Scruggs and Benegal analyze the data and show that it provides some support for trends in climate beliefs. However, local weather anomalies are linked with the likelihood that individuals express “pro-climate” opinions, and do not provide an adequate explanation for the size of the shift in public opinion.

3. Economic Conditions

There is considerable evidence that public support for the environment is inversely related to the health of the economy. This does not mean that environmental concerns are completely disregarded during recessions, but simply that there is a shift in priorities. According to the paper, the “Great Recession” is the biggest contributing factor to the shift in public opinion, and they use new survey evidence to map decline in concern with climate change to the economic recession. A summary graph of the results is provided below.

The three lines chart the response to the question “are we warming now” in three different surveys (Gallup, Pew and OSU/Stanford). Higher on the vertical axis represents a higher chance of answering “yes” while lower is the greater chance on answering “no.”

Scruggs and Benegal show that there is clear correlation between the economic indicators such the unemployment rate, and the priority given to climate change mitigation. This shows the profound impact of an economic crisis has on public support for a long-term problem such as climate change.

The authors conclude: “We evaluate over thirty years of public opinion data about global warming and the environment, and suggest that the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession.” For climate hawks, the good news is that belief in global warming and support for action may rebound when economic conditions improve. The bad news is that it is unlikely to happen before then, and more generally that support for climate action and other environmental initiatives is so vulnerable to fluctuations in economic conditions.

Resources from opinion polls

Gallup March 2011

Pew Center for the People and the Press. . “A Deeper Partisan Divide Over Global Warming.”  May 8, 2008

Pew Center for the People and the Press. “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming.” October 22, 2009

Pew Center for the People and the Press. Little Change in Opinions about Global Warming -Increasing Partisan Divide on Energy Policies. October 27, 2010.

Stanford University 2010. Majority of Americans Continue to Believe that Global Warming Is Real. March 9, 2010.

Stanford University. “Global Warming Poll: Selected results.” June 9, 2010

Note: after writing the initial version of this post, twitter changed it search parameters so that the code originally outlined did not do what it was  designed to do. We’ve revised the code so that it now works with the new search parameters.

I’ve been working on incorporating social media into my courses for the past several years. Here’s a description of what I’m doing this term in my sustainable forest policy class at UBC. I have a facebook page I try get students to “like” so they can share resources and ideas. I’ve been an active twitter user since 2009, and include a twitter feed on my course website. One of the issues I’ve confronted is limiting that feed to only those tweets most relevant to the course. I tweet on a lot on energy and climate issues, and politics, that are not directly relevant to the forest policy.

What I decided to do is have the feed show only tweets with the course-specific hashtag in it (in this case, #FRST415). That way I can control which of my tweets end up in the course feed, and students can get things in the feed as well by using that hashtag.

When we tried this, however, another dilemma came up. When my items with the course hashtag were retweeted, those would show up as well, creating a lot of redundancy. Our wonderful IT expert in Forestry, Renita Drakes, was able to redesign the search parameters in the twitter widget to exclude retweets of my items (although not those that others will post with the hashtag).

Here is how she has modified the code to create the feed I have on my website, shown here. We’re posting this in the event others might want to tailor this to their websites to avoid the same problems. Or if you have suggestions for improvement, please comment.

<!– START TWITTER CODE –>

<script src=”http://widgets.twimg.com/j/2/widget.js“></script>

<script>

new TWTR.Widget({

version: 2,

type: ‘search’,

search: ‘#frst415  -\”RT @ghoberg:\”‘,

interval: 10,

title: ‘Recent Tweets’,

subject: ‘Sustainable Forest Policy’,

width: 255,

height: 300,

theme: {

shell: {

background: ‘#74a0a3′,

color: ‘#ffffff’

},

tweets: {

background: ‘#ffffff’,

color: ‘#444444′,

links: ‘#74a0a3′

}

},

features: {

scrollbar: true,

loop: true,

live: true,

hashtags: true,

timestamp: true,

avatars: true,

toptweets: true,

behavior: ‘all’

}

}).render().start();

</script>

<!– END TWITTER CODE –>

pdf of this post Between consent and accommodation

The relationship between Canadian governments and Aboriginal groups continues to shift as a result of political developments and new jurisprudence. The power of Aboriginal groups seems to continually increase. Indeed, it may now be the case that it is not politically possible for natural resource projects in Canada to proceed if there is significant opposition from affected First Nations. This brief examines this issue by considering current Canadian law.

The Prosperity Mine case in British Columbia was quite revealing. The proposed mine went through both the BC and Federal environmental assessment processes. There were significant environmental concerns with the proposal, and First Nations in the area were resolutely opposed. The BC government considered these objections and approved the project. But the Harper Government examined the same concerns and rejected the project, citing among other reasons the strong objections of local First Nations to the proposed use of a cherished lake as a tailings pond.  (The proposal has now been altered and it going through review again.)

The core uncertainty is whether governments have the legal authority to proceed with a project if affected First Nations are strongly opposed. The unfortunate answer is that there is no clear answer to this question, and that it depends on the specific situation of the Aboriginal claim, the nature of the proposed infringement, the actions of government to address Aboriginal concerns, and the viewpoint of the reviewing courts.

The UN Declaration’s provision for “free, prior and informed consent”

First Nations groups increasingly refer to the provision in United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that  says “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources” (Article 32.1). However, the UN Declaration is not legally binding on signatories. When it finally endorsed the Declaration in November 2010, the Government of Canada took pains to note that it objects to the provision of “free, prior and informed consent when used as a veto.”  In explaining why it would endorse the Declaration if it had these objections, the government stated: “We are now confident that Canada can interpret the principles expressed in the Declaration in a manner that is consistent with our Constitution and legal framework.”

What does Canada’s legal framework say about government duties in these situations? The best indication of this we have at present are the companion 2004 Supreme Court cases of Haida and Taku. The Haida case was foundational in extending the government’s duty to consult to include the need to accommodate Aboriginal concerns. But the Supreme Court made it clear at the same time that the obligation to accommodate “does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what can be done with land pending final proof of the claim.” The less celebrated Taku case elaborates on this distinction by upholding a case of government approval of a resource project despite the continued opposition from the affected First Nation.

The Taku Supreme Court decision case study

In the early 1990s, Redfern Resources sought provincial approval to re-open the Tulsequah Chief underground mine near Atlin in northern British Columbia. Redfern planned to construct a 160 km access road which fell within the traditional territory of the Taku River Tlinglit First Nation (Taku Tlinglit). As part of the environmental review process, stakeholders, including Redfern and the Taku Tlinglit, formed a Project Committee. Three and a half years later, the Project Committee submitted its recommendations to the responsible ministers within the provincial government. The Taku Tlinglit disagreed with these recommendations and submitted their own minority report to the responsible Ministers. After reviewing both reports, the government granted Redfern a Project Approval Certificate (PAC).

Following the issuance of the PAC, the Taku Tlinglit began legal proceedings to overturn the Ministers’ decision, stating that the construction of the access road would infringe upon their title and traditional usage rights within the area. Both the lower court and the Court of Appeal agreed with the Taku Tlinglit; the appellate court stated that the PAC had been issued without due consideration for the Crown’s fiduciary and constitutional obligations with respect to the Taku Tlinglit. The Court of Appeal then asked the responsible Ministers to reconsider their decision, taking into account their legal obligations to the First Nation.

The province appealed the court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). The SCC released their ruling on November 18, 2004, finding unanimously in favour of the provincial government. In their decision, the SCC determined that the strength of the Taku Tlinglit’s claim the disputed area was strong enough to require that the Crown consult and attempt to accommodate their concerns. The strength of the Taku Tlinglit’s claim was due in large part to the fact that the land was currently the subject of treaty negotiations between the First Nation and the province. The Court also stated that the construction of the access road would prove highly disruptive to the cultural, social, and economic activities undertaken by the Taku Tlinglit in the area.

Nevertheless, the SCC stated that the province had adequately discharged its duty to consult and accommodate. “Its views were put before the decision makers, and the final project approval contained measures designed to address both its immediate and its long-term concerns. The Province was not under a duty to reach agreement with the TRTFN, and its failure to do so did not breach the obligations of good faith that it owed the TRTFN.”

By fully involving the Taku Tlinglit in the Project Committee review process, the province’s consultation process was found to be sufficiently inclusive and thorough. The SCC further concluded that the concerns of the Taku Tlinglit were taken into account by Redfern during their information gathering and analytical activities. The majority report produced by the Project Committee also took note of and recommended measures to remedy the Taku Tlinglit’s complaints. The Court was satisfied that there was further room in the more specific permitting process to address concerns about inadequate baseline information and the specific course of the road, and that a joint management authority would be establish to govern the road.

Taku’s vague standard for accommodation

The Supreme Court’s Taku decision is the closest thing we have to an articulated standard of sufficient accommodation. That standard remains extremely vague. It suggests that good faith efforts to address Aboriginal concerns can be demonstrated to be sufficient accommodation. But the specific conditions to meet that test are left deliberately vague, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, not defined outright.

The Supreme Court concludes:

“Where consultation is meaningful, there is no ultimate duty to reach agreement. Rather, accommodation requires that Aboriginal concerns be balanced reasonably with the potential impact of the particular decision on those concerns and with competing societal concerns. Compromise is inherent to the reconciliation process. In this case, the Province accommodated TRTFN concerns by adapting the environmental assessment process and the requirements made of Redfern in order to gain project approval. I find, therefore, that the Province met the requirements of its duty toward the TRTFN.”

This standard is clearly quite a distance from the “free, prior and informed consent” of the UN Declaration. How far the Canadian governmental practice and jurisprudence have moved in that direction will only, it seems, be revealed through further decisions on resource authorizations and judicial review.

Additional Sources:

Blakes Bulletin on Litigation, http://www.blakes.com/english/legal_updates/litigation/nov_2004/Litigation-Haida-Nov2004.pdf

Mark Haddock, Comparison of the British Columbia and Federal Environmental Assessments for the Prosperity Mine, Northwest Institute for Bioregional Research, July 2011. http://northwestinstitute.ca/downloads/NWI_EAreport_July2011.pdf

Looking for a description of how Canadian governments, federal and provincial, formally produce public policies? Here’s one attempt to do it graphically.

I find myself increasingly teaching the policy process to students who have no background in Canadian government, other than what they might have learned in high school if they happened to do that in Canada. I actually enjoy the lecture I’ve designed that outlines the roles of the Governor General, Parliament, cabinet, the Prime Minster, etc. This year when teaching this to a class of graduate engineering students, I was asked for a diagram. I set out to find one in the literature, and came up with nothing. So with the help of Stephanie Taylor, I created two versions. One that works for provincial governments (I work mostly on environment and resources so those are the dominant jurisdictions), and one that generalizes across the Government of Canada and the provinces.

In these diagrams, we’ve tried to show the flow of policies from enabling legislation through implementation in ministries, their impact on target groups, and formal feedback between society and government through votes and taxes. We also tried to capture the role of courts in influencing policy.

I’ll be continuing to teach this material, so I’d be grateful if you could point me to similar diagrams, or have any suggestions for improvement.

George Hoberg
May 7, 2011

Great news: The new premier of British Columbia has reiterated the Provinces’s commitment, initiated under previous Premier Gordon Campbell, to leadership on climate action policy. Here is an open letter just released from the Premier’s office to British Columbians:

Open Letter to British Columbians from Premier Christy Clark
May 6, 2011

Building on BC’s Leadership in the Green Economy

Over the past several years, BC has gained international recognition for being a leader on the green economy and taking strong, bold steps to reduce our carbon footprint. We have set legislated targets to reduce our carbon emissions 33% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. And we, as a province, have taken strong, bold steps to achieve them.

When I took office on March 14th, there were important decisions on my plate:

. Do we follow the path that has been laid out through 2012 on the carbon tax?

. Do we continue to be engaged with other provinces and states in developing policies to reduce carbon emissions?

In both cases, the answer is yes. It’s in BC’s interests to be leading change in order to leverage our bountiful supply of renewable resources and clean energy, and, more importantly, our expertise and creativity in adapting to a greener economy.

Climate change is having a major impact on BC, whether it is the devastation of our forests by the mountain pine beetle, the impact on our water supply due to melting glaciers, or extreme weather events.

Governments, communities, and businesses around the world are confronting climate change, some places more than others, but there is unquestionably a movement taking place that is changing the way our economy works.

BC is on the leading edge of the new, green economy . a decision that was reinforced by the electorate in the 2009 election when it made a choice to elect a government committed to moving ahead with courageous climate change policies.

New green jobs being are being created and cleaner technology is being utilized whether it is a new district energy system at Simon Fraser University, new technology on drilling rigs in our natural gas sector, or new bio]energy production in Prince George. As well, the announcement by Mercedes Benz to locate the production of electric vehicle fuel cells in Burnaby, confirms that BC is seen as a leader in the new green economy.

Where do we go from here?

The carbon tax has put a price on carbon, while returning that revenue back to individuals and businesses through tax cuts. The purpose is to provide, over time, an incentive for individuals and businesses to reduce carbon use. To date, we have cut more taxes than the amount collected by the carbon tax.

In the future, I am open to considering using the carbon tax to support regional initiatives, such as public transit. If we go this route, we must ensure that the allocation of carbon tax revenue respects regions and communities so that one region is not subsidizing investments in another.

We will continue to play a leadership role through the Western Climate Initiative to design a cap and trade system that works for our environment and our economy. Cap and trade requires the participation of trading partners, and BC will work with California and other participating jurisdictions, while consulting extensively with stakeholders in BC.

As we go forward, one thing is for certain: we will work to achieve our targets to reduce carbon emissions and continue to be a leader in North America on the green economy. Not in a vacuum, but by working together with British Columbian families, communities, and businesses.

Premier Christy Clark

Christy Clark was sworn in as British Columbia’s 35^th premier yesterday. In announcing her new cabinet, Premier Clark reversed significant parts of the tumultuous reorganization introduced by Gordon Campbell in October 2010. The centerpiece of Campbell’s reorganization was the creation of a new Ministry of Natural Resource Operations to consolidate operational functions of several natural resource organizations in an effort to create “one land manager.” The change caused considerable uncertainty and confusion.

Yesterday, Premier Clark put Natural Resources Operations back together with the Ministry of Forests and Lands. Mines, which Campbell had moved to the Ministry of Forests, has been returned to the Ministry of Energy (now Energy and Mines). There are no apparent changes of significance to Environment, Agriculture, or Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation.

click on chart to see more detail

Reversal in Rationales?

As we argued in our post on the October reorganization, organizational design involves complex trade-offs and reorganizations frequently produces unintended consequences. The new reorganization reverses one of the core rationales for the October changes: separating operations from policy. Since the justification for that change was questionable to start with, bringing policy and operations back under the same organizational umbrella probably makes more sense.

But Premier Clark’s change also seems to at least partly reverse one of the beneficial effects of the prior reorganization: bringing the operational approval decisions for multiple resources into the same organization. Responsibility for energy and major mining operational decisions has been moved back into the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This reversal would seem to undermine the promise of the October reorganization of improving the capacity of the government to address the cumulative impact of multiple resources, as well as deliver on the “one land manager” vision.

New Stability or More Turmoil?

Given the uncertainty created by the October reorganization, the staff of natural resource agencies and their clients would certainly benefit from a period of stability. Premier Clark’s personnel announcements send mixed signals. On the one hand, the leadership of the new organization might indicate that the new MFLNRO is here to stay for a while. Steve Thomson, who Campbell had made minister of the new Ministry of Natural Resource Operations, has been appointed Minister of the enlarged agency. Doug Konkin, the architect of the October reorganization, has been appointed Deputy Minister.

On the other hand, Premier Clark also signaled that the entire structure is under review. While details have yet to be released, Randy Hawes has been appointed Parliamentary Secretary for Natural Resource Operations Review. If the new organization were settled, there wouldn’t seem to be a need for a high profile review position.

Forestry First Again?

The October reorganization was in part justified by an acknowledgement that the relative role of forestry on the land base has been in decline over the past decade. While it is perhaps only a symbolic change, the fact that Forestry gets pride of place in the enlarged organization’s name may be significant. The new name hardly roles off the tongue and is remarkably long (exceeded in this cabinet only by Labour, Citizens’ Services and Open Government), so there must have been a strong reason to maintain Forests in the title.

Perhaps of greater significance, the BC Forest Service has been reunited. The October reorganization had torn apart an organization, founded in 1912, with a strong culture and great deal of pride. The new organization brings it back together.

For now at least.

The Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions released a White Paper today that I wrote with University of Victoria grad student Amy Sopinka.  The report analyzes the Government of British Columbia’s new strategy to become a net exporter in electricity trade.  This new initiative promises to promote economic development and contribute to greenhouse gas reductions in other jurisdictions. The report highlights significant uncertainties in the market for BC electricity exports, and identifies major gaps in the policy framework. In particular, the policy framework does not require that electricity projects are a net benefit to British Columbians, and the planning process is not adequate to address the environmental and social risks of the project.

To view the media release from PICS, go here.

To view the full paper, The Export Question: Designing Policy for British Columbia Electricity Trade, go here

Forests can emit carbon dioxide when the land is cleared, especially through burning, or when trees are left to rot. On the flip side, forests can soak up carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates about 20% of global carbon dioxide emissions come from deforestation, which is roughly the same as transportation. The world has tried before to develop a global deforestation treaty, with very limited success. The new treatment of forests as carbon emitters and sinks, however, created an agreement in Cancun.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is a simple concept, until you start to work out the details. In essence, REDD provides payments to keep forests intact and healthy so they stop emitting carbon dioxide and start soaking it out of the atmosphere. Many activities will qualify, including forest conservation, sustainable management and replanting. Six countries (US, UK, Australia, Norway, Japan and France) announced US$3.5 billion to kick-start REDD+ activities. Over another billion has been added since. These funds will add to efforts already underway by the World Bank and the UN.  REDD is, perhaps, the most substantive part of the Cancun Climate Accord.

A year ago in Copenhagen, REDD was also considered ripe for agreement. However, the agreement didn’t come and parties spent another year wrestling over contentious topics, particularly funding. Over the summer, the REDD+ Partnership was created to oversee the funds. It became mired in controversy for its lack of inclusion and slow pace. Governments, notably Bolivia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, started to backtrack on previous progress, introducing fundamental changes to REDD, including removing the word “emissions.” The previous promise of REDD retreated among fears, and some cautious optimism, that REDD would again fail in Cancun.

We have an agreement, signed by all states except Bolivia. The agreement tasks developing countries, who voluntarily participate, to develop national REDD plans that include environmental and social safeguards. These safeguards, although in an annex, specify natural biodiversity and local communities are to be protected. The agreement lays out three phases for activity. Phase one is a capacity building stage to help developing countries develop monitoring capacity, information about forest stocks and national plans. Phase two involves implementation and continued capacity building. Finally, results are measured against the baseline created in phase one and credits are earned. A key component is that REDD is results-based. All avoided emissions must be monitored, reported and verified.

There are important pieces missing. The two standouts are financing and monitoring. It may cost$17-33 billion to halve emissions from the forestry sector by 2030 according a review commissioned by the UK government. Some countries want a market system where developing countries can sell their REDD credits to developed countries. Other states, such as Bolivia and Brazil, want a fund-based system, where developed countries would provide financing for REDD activities as part of their overseas development assistance. The current agreement is silent which option is preferred, although a fund is established for the short term. The other important missing piece is monitoring. Currently, there is no standard way to monitor carbon emissions from forests, although there is guidance from the IPCC and private sector initiatives. Substantial technical work remains to make REDD credits based on actual, measured results.

How did we get from fear in September to an agreement (albeit an incomplete one)? By linking deforestation and climate change, new leverage points and incentives created political will in developed and developing countries. Developing countries can create a new source of income by conserving or rebuilding their forests. Developed states might be able to earn credits, but more importantly, earn leverage over each other. The U.S. has stated developing countries must shoulder some of the burden and reduce emissions. This reason is often used to justify American inaction. REDD provides the opportunity for developing countries to reduce their emissions.  With developing countries on board, the EU can claim the US no longer has reason to avoid reducing its emissions.

Countries that threw up roadblocks earlier, such as Saudi Arabia, might have also been appeased in the broader climate change accord. The Cancun Accord leaves the door open to carbon capture and storage becoming part of the Clean Development Mechanism, once leakage and other technical issues are resolved. Saudi Arabia argued for this technology’s inclusion because it allows oil production to continue while emissions reduce, meaning demand for Saudi oil can continue.

While the world failed to address deforestation in a global treaty before, we now have one in the guise of a climate agreement. Until funding and monitoring are addressed, the merits of the agreement cannot be fully assessed. The ability of the REDD to translate into meaningful reductions by developing countries may spell out the likelihood of a more substantive climate agreement. If REDD fails to lead to reductions in developing countries, old excuses for inaction remain. If REDD succeeds, then the world is hard pressed for diplomatic reasons to refuse a meaningful agreement. Linking these issues has linked their successes and failures. Success in global climate governance may hinge on the details of REDD.

Jennifer Allan is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Her interests are the global environmental politics of forest governance.