New Research: How the Government of Alberta and the Oil Sands Industry Have Thwarted More Effective Regulation

Posted on November 29, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg
November 29, 2011

A new article in the Canadian Journal of Political Science describes the strategies used by the Government of Alberta and the oil sands industry to deflect pressure for more rigorous environmental regulation of the oil sands. Playing Defence: Early Responses to Conflict Expansion in the Oil Sands Policy Subsystem (pdf available below) by George Hoberg and Jeffrey Phillips, examines how powerful policy actors defend themselves against opponents’ demands for change through a case study on the oil sands of Alberta.

Political science theories of public policy conflict focus on interactions among three forces: actors (or interests), ideas, and institutions. The approaches we find most useful are “actor-centred” in that they focus on strategic actors pursuing their interests by adopting strategies that make the optimal use of their resources. Strategies can involve developing coalitions with other actors, working in the arena of ideas through strategic “framing” of issues, and “venue-shifting” to select the institutional arena most advantageous to their interests. The oil sands case is rife with framing dynamics, with the conflict between “dirty oil” and “ethical oil” frames being the most obvious example. This article, however, deals with the institutional strategies.

In response to an escalation of criticism of its performance on environmental regulation and related issues in the mid 2000s, the Government of Alberta sought to contain the conflict by pursuing a strategy of selective opening of the policy process through multi-stakeholder consultations. Our article is strongly influenced by the work of political scientist Sarah Pralle and management theorist Christine Oliver. Oliver highlights alternatives faced by organizations under attack: acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, and manipulate. The Alberta government and oil industry have not acquiesced, have compromised perhaps a bit, and have persistently avoided and then defied criticisms. When defiance and avoidance became harder to justify, they turned to a type of manipulation by inviting stakeholders, including aboriginal groups and environmentalists, into consultation processes that dragged on without producing meaningful policy change reflecting the concerns of oil sands critics.

We look at three such processes. In the one case were the terms of reference focused on facilitating industrial expansion of the oil sands (the Radke report), the pro-development recommendations were quickly adopted by government. In the other two processes, recommendations posing challenges to the dominant industry–government power nexus have not been acted upon. In the case of the Oil Sands Consultations Multi-stakeholder Committee consensus voting rules were used to block changes. Even in cases where there was cross-sectoral support—the Cumulative Environmental Management Association (CEMA) land use recommendations—the government failed to act on the recommended policy change. As the paper concludes: “The emerging pattern seems to be not consultation for regulation, but consultation instead of regulation; what might be dubbed a strategy of ‘talk and dig.’”

The article closes by questioning the sustainability of the oil sands establishment’s defensive strategy, essentially a form of co-optation in which opposition actors are neutralized or won over by assimilating them into the established power structure. Thus far, this strategy has been relatively successful in containing change. But it is important to recognize the risks of cooptation, properly understood, as a strategy. The most well-developed treatment of co-optation, sociologist Philip Selznick’s classic TVA and the Grassroots, is based on a different interpretation of co-optation than the current conventional meaning. Selznick’s concept involved opposition groups being brought into the dominant power structure, but in doing so, the official goals of the organization had to be altered—a process he called “goal displacement.” As the paper concludes:  “Mollifying opponents can risk providing legitimacy to their point of view and, as a result, lead to a shift in power and policy change. In the oil sands case, the government of Alberta has formally acknowledged the legitimacy of environmental critics by giving them a formal voice in the consultation processes. Now that environmentalists have denounced those processes and withdrawn, the government’s strategy has lost its legitimacy.”

Since the research for the article has been completed, criticisms of the oil sands have expanded but so have the defensive strategies of the oil sands establishment. There is little indication, however, that any significant shift in power over oil sands policy has occurred within the Canadian political system. For that to happen, some major disruption of the policy subsystem will need to occur. The surprising decision by the Obama administration to postpone the approval of the Keystone XL pipeline is a sign that the cracks in the fortress may be growing.

Citation:

George Hoberg and Jeffrey Phillips, “Playing Defence: Early Responses to Conflict Expansion in the Oil Sands Policy Subsystem,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 44:3 (September/septembre 2011) 507–527 doi:10.10170S0008423911000473
© 2011 Canadian Political Science Association (l’Association canadienne de science politique) And/et la Société québécoise de science politique
access pdf: Hoberg and Phillips CJPS

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Insights into Obama’s Keystone XL decision from the energy policy wonkosphere

Posted on November 11, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg
November 11, 2011

Yesterday the Obama administration shook the foundations of the energy sector by calling for further review of the Keystone XL pipeline and putting off a decision until 2013. The decision left the Canadian oil establishment dumbfounded, wondering, as a Financial Post columnist put it, “why a project that Canada’s Prime Minister described as a “no brainer,” that was so desperately needed by both countries, was sunk so spectacularly by a loosely organized, fact-challenged, emotion-driven posse of anti-oil protesters.”

The unexpected decision has produced some keen insights from some great climate/energy policy thinkers. I provide a quick summary here, and I’ve added some of my own thoughts at the bottom.

Michael Levi of the Council of Foreign Relations has a piece in the New York Times, and he followed up today with an additional blog. His New York Times op-ed emphasizes how the action-blocking nimbyism reflected by the Keystone XL victory could backfire against broader efforts to combat climate change: “The tactics and arguments that have won the day are ultimately as likely to retard clean energy development as they are to thwart dirty fuels.” Big wind projects, new transmission lines for a smart grid, and certainly new nuclear plants will all provoke the type of nimbyism that the anti-Keystone protesters have just validated.

Levi’s Friday blog elaborated on this theme by trying to speculate on what kind of political coalition could be successful in bringing legislative change in the United States. He is troubled that the anti-Keystone protests (which Levi compares to the Tea Party!) have soured relations with potential allies, such as moderate Republican, proactive energy companies, and investment banks, that would be necessary to get over the daunting hurdle of 60 votes in the U.S. Senate.

Time writer Bryan Walsh gives props to the climate movement for its political effectiveness in this case: “Of course, Keystone presented a unique opportunity in the mind-numbingly complex world of climate politics to focus public attention—and fear—on a single project that could be stopped. It was a pressure point, and McKibben and company applied a perfect Vulcan nerve pinch on it. They deserve to feel good.” But Walsh then makes much the same argument as Levi about the risk of nimbyism for a clean energy future, and questions whether the negative politics can be turned to political success for more concerted climate action.

(Levi and Walsh are taken to task by Grist blogger Christopher Mims for not appreciating the potential for distributed energy system the he believes can avoid the big project nimbyism.)

Andrew Leach of the University of Alberta Business School looks more specifically at the implications for the oil sands. He argues that there is currently surplus capacity in oil sands pipelines, but that a pinch could occur in 2020 without more pipeline capacity. He also notes there are opportunities to expand capacity without new pipeline routes from Alberta. Leach endorses Levi and Walsh’s concerns about nimbyism, but also has some very insightful comments about political strategies of project proponents, including Canada’s Prime Minister and Alberta’s Minister of Energy. “If  you play poker, and you’re going to raise the stakes,” Leach reminds the Canadian oil establishment, “it helps to have a winning hand.”

My 2 Cents

I’ve had a somewhat different perspective from my colleagues on the anti-Keystone protests. I agree about the concerns of validating nimbyism. My larger concern about the climate movement’s choice to focus so intently on this issue is that it risked externalizing the climate problem for Americans: that carbon emissions were something that came from the tar sands up north, rather than out of their tailpipes at home.

My wonk colleagues have been critical of the anti-Keystone campaign for not pursuing strategies that were optimal from a cost-effective climate mitigation perspective. I don’t challenge that conclusion. But that is the wrong, or at least terribly incomplete, standard by which to judge a social movement. I have had a lot more time and patience for the action because I believe it was the right choice at the right time for the climate movement.

The anti-Keystone campaign needs to be seen first and foremost as a regrouping and movement building exercise for climate activists.  The broad coalition put together for Waxman-Markey was impressive at an elite level, but it failed to galvanize sufficiently intense public support to withstand the Republican/Koch backlash. McKibben and friends recognized that to have meaningful success, more direct action would be required to galvanize the intensity of preferences at the grassroots level needed to foster a powerful social movement. Keystone XL turned out to be a perfect short-term vehicle for that.

It has to be recognized as a remarkably shrewd and stunningly successful tactic. It is, for now, a battle won in a much longer and larger struggle. The great challenge is in leveraging that success for something larger and more enduring. The barriers are colossal. The movement isn’t close to being united on its core ask – is it cap and trade, a carbon tax, a Manhattan project style commitment to renewables? Congress is dominated by a party that doesn’t believe in anthropogenic global warming. The public is focused on economic anxieties, and social movement energy is being captured by a focus on economic inequality through Occupy Wall Street.

The Keystone protests have given the climate movement some grassroots muscle. Time to work together on the heavier lifting.

Posted in Climate Action Policy, Energy Pipelines, Oil Sands | Leave a comment

Foreign influence on Canadian energy and environmental policy: A request for some balance

Posted on November 9, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg
November 9, 2011

Over the past several months, there has been increasing attention in the media on the role of US foundation funding of groups active in the Canadian environmental movement, including those involving the oil sands and associated pipelines such as the Northern Gateway pipeline. I believe these concerns are important, but it is time to bring some greater balance to the discussion.

Much of the information on US foundation funding has been uncovered by researcher and blogger Vivian Krause. According to Krauses’ blog, “since 2000 USA foundations have poured at least $300 million into the environmental movement in Canada.” Prominent mainstream media columnists have picked up on this research and used it to question the credibility of Canadian environmental organizations. This week, Calgary Herald business columnist Deborah Yeldin questioned the authenticity of opponents who have signed up to speak at the Northern Gateway pipeline hearings, and blasted US foundations for interfering in these Canadian disputes. She asks “whether the involvement, nay, interference, by U.S. foundations in the development of Canada’s natural resources constitutes a violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement or of Canadian economic sovereignty.” She concludes with what sounds like a call to arms for Canadian nationalists: “At a minimum, Canadians should be outraged there are organizations based outside this country that feel they have the right to interfere in the development of Canada’s natural resources.”

A month ago, Vancouver Sun columnist Barbara Yaffe made a similar argument in a column entitled “Cash flow from U.S. to ‘green’ initiatives often hides private interests – Financial contributions sometimes thinly veiled attempts to help American industries gain unfair advantages over Canadian counterparts.” Yaffe argued “Canadians need to be aware that the long arm of American interests is behind many of the so-called grassroots protests taking place in Western Canada.”

I have a number of thoughts about these arguments. One is that the apparent dependence of the Canadian environmental movement on US foundations is dismaying. I wish more of their funding came from donations from members or charitable foundations in Canada. Second, there is little question that funding from US foundations has increased the capacity and influence of the Canadian environmental movement. Third, I find the arguments made by Krause and Yaffe that there is some kind of illicit commercial interest behind US foundations support for the Canadian environmental movement far-fetched.

We need to bring some perspective into the discussion of US and foreign influence in Canadian environmental and resource policy. The notion that foreign influence is on the side of environmentalists and in opposition to corporate interests in resource development is bizarre. Foreign ownership of the Canadian resource sector has been significant and long-standing. Statistics Canada keeps statistics on foreign ownership. The table below shows foreign ownership statistics for the 2009, the most recent year for which data are available. More than a third of assets in the Canadian oil and gas sector are foreign owned, and foreign-owned companies received 51% of all revenues in the sector. Here’s the membership list for the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers.

% under foreign control (2009)
Assets – all industries 19.6
Assets – oil and gas extraction and related activities 35.3
Operating revenues – all industries 28.5
Operating revenues — oil and gas extraction and related activities 51.1
Profits – all industries 20.1
Profits — oil and gas extraction and related activities 41.3
Source: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/111013/t111013b1-eng.htm

These foreign-owned companies are certainly highly active in attempting to influence Canadian natural resource policy. Here is just one example of Chinese pressure being felt by Canadian policy-makers. Yedlin argues we “should be outraged organizations based outside this country that feel they have the right to interfere in the development of Canada’s natural resources.” Let’s just be sure when considering foreign influence, we are not only talking about US philanthropic foundations, but foreign-owned oil companies as well.

The Northern Gateway pipeline is proposed by Enbridge, a Canadian company, to ship diluted bitumen from Canadian and multinational oil companies in Alberta to Chinese or Californian refineries. It seems remarkable  that media attention has been focused on US foundation influence on the Canadian environmental movement and ignored foreign influence of oil companies with billion dollar stakes in the issue.

Posted in Oil Sands | 8 Comments

The Oil Sands and Canadian Identity – a Starter List

Posted on October 12, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg and Andrea Rivers
October 13, 2011

I’m preparing to give a talk on “The Oil Sands: Canada’s Defining Dilemma,” wading into a type of analysis that is a bit different. Andrea and I have been collecting quotes as feedstock for this that use the oil sands in a positive or negative light to draw more general characterizations about Canadian identity. We thought we might  try crowdsourcing the data gathering by posting a sample of the best so far in an effort to provoke more submissions. So feel free to comment adding links to statements in the media or elsewhere.

“I will make this general point, which is that, first of all, importing oil from countries that are stable and friendly is a good thing”
President Barack Obama
http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Obama+cites+destructive+Canadian+oilsands+hints+withholding+approval/4576002/story.html#ixzz1accVdSim

“There has been a demonizing of a legitimate resource. It is ethical oil.
 It is regulated oil. And it’s secure oil in a world where many of the free
 world’s oil sources are somewhat less secure.”
Peter Kent, Federal Environment Minister
http://www2.canada.com/business/kent+says+oilsands+unfairly+demonized/4066212/story.html?id=4066212

“It is a regulated product in an energy superpower democracy. The profits from this oil are not used in undemocratic or unethical ways. The proceeds are used to better society in the great Canadian democracy. The wealth generated is shared with Canadians, with investors.”
Peter Kent, Federal Environment Minister
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/peter-kents-green-agenda-clean-up-oil-sands-dirty-reputation/article1860820/

“The oilsands are one of Canada’s most vital industries, spinning off billions of dollars annually into the economy, and employing tens of thousands of workers, from First Nations to Newfoundland, and yet, they are responsible for roughly 5% of all of Canada’s annual greenhouse gas emissions”
Ethicaloil.org
http://www.ethicaloil.org/news/myth-busting-“are-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-the-oilsands-ruining-the-atmosphere”/

“In reality, the oilsands have quickly become one of the entire country’s most vibrant job creators. And the benefits to people from B.C. to the Atlantic provinces have mushroomed at a breathtaking rate, and promise to deliver decades, and billions of dollars, more in benefits to regions all across Canada, including some of the most economically challenged places in the country.”
Ethicaloil.org
http://www.ethicaloil.org/news/mythbusting-dont-the-oilsands-only-benefit-alberta/

“In today’s world, all fossil fuels are unethical”
David Suzuki
http://www.canada.com/business/Column+David+Suzuki+moral+relativism+ethics/5506222/story.html#ixzz1a87uF6VP

“Just as we called on President Obama to reject the pipeline, we are calling on you to use your power to halt the expansion of the tar sands – and ensure that Canada moves towards a clean energy future.”
Letter to Stephen Harper signed by 8 Nobel Peace Prize Winners
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/nobel-laureates-press-harper-to-oppose-alberta-oil-sands-expansion/article2183726/

“Canada’s image lies in tatters. It is now to climate what Japan is to whaling. The tar barons have held the nation to ransom. This thuggish petro-state is today the greatest obstacle to a deal in Copenhagen”

George Monbiot
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/nov/30/canada-tar-sands-copenhagen-climate-deal

“An area the size of England, of pristine forests and marshes, will be dug up, unless the Canadians can stop this madness. Already it looks like a scene from the end of the world: the strip-miners are creating a churned black hell on an unimaginable scale.”
George Monbiot
http://www.monbiot.com/2009/12/01/the-urgent-threat-to-world-peace-is-%E2%80%A6-canada/

“Canada is a cultured, peaceful nation, which every so often allows a band of rampaging Neanderthals to trample all over it. Timber companies were licensed to log the old-growth forest in Clayoquot Sound; fishing companies were permitted to destroy the Grand Banks: in both cases these get-rich-quick schemes impoverished Canada and its reputation. But this is much worse, as it affects the whole world. The government’s scheming at the climate talks is doing for its national image what whaling has done for Japan.”
George Monbiot
http://www.monbiot.com/2009/12/01/the-urgent-threat-to-world-peace-is-%E2%80%A6-canada/

“The tar sands represent a path of broken treaties, eroded human rights, catastrophic climate change, poisoned air and water and the complete stripping of Canada’s morality in the international community.”
Clayton Thomas-Muller, Indigenous Environmental Network
http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/recent/Hundreds-gather-on-Parliament-Hill-to-tell-Harper-No-to-Tar-Sands-/

“Symbolically, the pipeline would be a fitting monument to Canada’s resource history – a horizontal exclamation point at the end of five centuries of exploitation, from beaver pelts to mining, forestry and cod. Indeed. Enbridge has touted it as a piece of national infrastructure, akin to the St. Lawrence Seaway.”
Chris Turner, Journalist  (on proposed pipeline from Alberta to BC Coast for export)

“There’s a tendency in some circles to treat the oil sands as a prairie aberration, but part of the reason the industry has thrived is that it’s so consistent with the country’s traditional economy. The oil sands are as Canadian as a Hudson’s Bay blanket.”
Chris Turner, Journalist
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/pipeline-to-prosperity-or-channel-to-catastrophe/article2169406/

“Nations become what they produce. Bitumen, the new national staple, is redefining the character and destiny of Canada. Rapid development of the tar sands has created a foreign policy that favours the export of bitument to the United States and lax immigration standards that champion the import of global bitumen workers. Inadequate environmental rules and monitoring have allowed unsustainable mining to accelerate. Feeble fiscal regimes have enriched multinationals and given Canada a petrodollar that hides inflationary pressures of peak oil Canada now calls itself an “emerging energy superpower”. In reality it is nothing more than a Third World energy supermarket”
Andrew Nikiforuk, Author of Tarsands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent (p. 2)

“ Without long term planning and policies, Canada and Alberta will fail to secure reliable energy supplies for Canadians, develop alternative sources for the country, or to create valuable resource funds for the future. Unlike the governments of Norway and Alaska, the government of Canada stands to leave citizens a singular legacy of exponential neglect and water-shed destruction”
Andrew Nikiforuk, Author of Tarsands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent (p. 4)

Posted in Oil Sands | 3 Comments

The Disappearing Issue: Forestry Content in British Columbia Speeches from the Throne, 2000-11

Posted on October 4, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg with help from Lisa Jung, and Alvin Shum
October 4, 2011

Issues come and go, but the collapse of forestry on the agenda of the government of British Columbia is extraordinary. Yesterday’s Throne Speech did not contain the words forest, forests, or forestry.

I got curious and had some students go back and look at previous thrown speeches over the past decade to see if there was any precedent for this. The results from 2000 to present are on the chart below (click to enlarge). There was in fact one other Throne Speech during this period that did not mention forests – Gordon Campbell’s first in 2001. The mean for the 17 speeches over this period is 10 references, with a peak of 28 in 2003 and another in 2009.

I have no rigorous explanation for the trends, but the two peaks and then steady declines afterwards are quite striking. The first peak was Gordon Campbell’s “year of the forest” in 2003, when a big burst of forest legislation was brought forth, centered about the Forest Revitalization Act. That was a period of real policy action. The second peak was 2009, when the government wanted to appear responsive to the Great Recession and the crippling impact it has on the forest industry. It released a Forestry Roundtable report and there were a variety of initiatives coming Premier Campbell’s energy and climate initiatives with forestry. But little policy change emerged during that period, and as the government ran out of tools to attempt to reverse the decline in forest jobs, it seems to have dropped the subject all together.

The complete absence of forestry from the Throne Speech is indeed striking. Two-thirds of the province is covered with forests, and the condition of the forest is vital to many environmental services enjoyed by British Columbians. Despite the recent decline, product products are still, according to the 2010 State of Forests Report, “the most important export commodity accounting for 30% of the total value of B.C. goods exports in 2009.” Despite sharp declines in employment over the past decade, the forest products industry still provides nearly 60,000 direct jobs. For a Premier focused on creating jobs, the absence of a strategy that includes measures for the forest sector is surprising.

The only conclusion I can draw is that the Clark government simply does not see the problems of the forest sector as something the government has the tools to address at this point in time. No doubt, the rejuvenation of the softwood lumber conflict contributes to the wariness of an already reticent government.

Posted in BC Forest Policy | Leave a comment

Canada’s West Coast Oil Sands Pipeline Controversy: An Update

Posted on September 23, 2011 by admin

Andrea Rivers and George Hoberg
September 23, 2011

While controversy over the Keystone XL oil sands pipeline to the US has been capturing headlines across North America, a similar controversy is simmering in Western Canada.

Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline proposal is gaining increasing attention as it proceeds through the federal government’s regulatory review process. Enbridge’s plans to construct a twin pipeline carrying Alberta bitumen to the coast of British Columbia for export to Asia are currently undergoing an environmental assessment by a review panel jointly appointed by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency and the National Energy Board.

In May 2011, we developed a case document for the Northern Gateway proposal detailing project specifics, the review and approval process, responsible government authorities, and various stakeholder groups. The cases for and against the project – including economic issues, social issues regarding First Nations rights and title, and environmental issues are also outlined. This blog entry highlights recent developments in these areas and presents opportunities for public participation in the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline joint review process.

Update: Less Uncertainty about Economic Support

Enbridge touts the economic benefits of Northern Gateway, promising expanding markets for Canadian petroleum products and, the #1 priority of BC’s current government, job creation. The project continues to acquire support from influential foreign investors interested in Canadian crude exports and, in August, Enbridge announced it has agreed to terms with would-be shipping companies. Enbridge has received $250 million in funding from several companies to support the regulatory process. Although the company declines to reveal the identities of its supporters, large Chinese oil companies Sinopec and CNOOC Ltd. have reportedly invested. The “China effect” has a hold on other sectors of western Canada’s resource-based economy beyond Alberta bitumen. Export values of lumber, coal, and aluminum to China, as well as investments in liquefied natural gas, are on the rise. The economic benefits Enbridge promises by bridging the gap to Asian petroleum markets are consistent with aspects of the “BC Jobs Plan” unveiled this week. BC Premier Christy Clark has emphasized the importance of creating links to Asia-Pacific markets through the North Coast of BC as the key to a “bright economic future for British Columbians”.

Update: First Nations Opposition

Issues regarding First Nations Rights and Title remain a cornerstone of the project’s opposition. If approved, the pipeline will pass through the territories of over 40 First Nations, none of which have publically expressed support for the project despite Enbridge’s offers for ownership stakes. The Yinka Dene Alliance of First Nations have been among the most spoken adversaries of the project, rejecting Enbridge’s offer for equity in the pipeline and calling it a “desperate and disrespectful attempt to buy our support”.  The alliance of Coastal First Nations remains staunchly opposed to the project as the pipeline would reach the coast through the Great Bear Rainforest posing the threat of oil spills

Update: Marine Planning Controversy

The relationship between Coastal First Nations and the federal government may become strained due to recent developments regarding the Pacific North Coast Integrated Marine Area Plan (PNCIMA). Earlier this month, the federal government walked away from an agreement to receive funding from a U.S. green foundation to complete the management plan, in accordance with the Oceans Act. Enacted in 1997, this legislation requires the federal government to develop plans to protect marine areas. In 2008, the federal government formally agreed to work with the Coastal First Nations on developing the PNCIMA, a follow-up to the land-based protection the Great Bear Initiative had accomplished.

According to the Vancouver Sun, environmental organizations allege the Harper government is disregarding scientists and policy makers in favor of strong shipping and petroleum lobbies. On the other hand, stakeholders from these industries had expressed concerns over an environmentally-oriented foundation funding the government process, and that the outcome might prove unfavorable for the Northern Gateway proposal. However, it is the opinion of West Coast Environmental Law, that the federal government’s actions regarding PNCIMA ironically will hinder, not help, approval of Enbridge’s pipeline proposal by causing future legal complications as it could be perceived as involving dishonorable actions against the Coastal First Nations.

Opportunities for Public Participation

Public participation is a significant component of the Joint Panel Review (JRP) process for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline. In May of 2011 the JRP issued a hearing order for the project detailing the process and participation opportunities. West Coast Environmental Law has compiled a document summarizing opportunities for public participation in the JRP process. Anyone can present their knowledge, concerns, or opinions regarding the proposed project to the review panel by submitting a letter of comment to the review panel (before the March 13, 2012 deadline), or by registering here to make an oral statement at the panel’s community hearings (before the October 6th, 2011 deadline).

The Dogwood Initiative is encouraging concerned BC residents to put their opposition to gateway on record by establishing the “mob the mic” campaign with the goal of 1,000 public submissions for oral statements registered by October 1st, 2011. On the campaign’s webpage interested individuals or groups can register to give a statement and their information will be forwarded to the Joint Review Panel (JRP).

Community hearings for the Enbridge review panel are open to all members of the public and will take place in early 2012 at numerous locations along the route of the proposed pipeline, in Vancouver, and in Port Hardy. Exact locations and dates are to be identified later as the hearing schedule is dependent on the numbers and locations of submission registration.

Reference:

George Hoberg and Andrea Rivers, Should Canada Approve the Construction of a Pipeline from the Oil Sands to the West Coast of Canada? The Enbridge Northern Gateway Case, A Case Document for ISES 2011, International Student Energy Summit, Vancouver, BC. June 2011. http://www.studentenergy.org/images/downloads/ISES%202011%20Northern%20Gateway%20Pipeline%20Case.pdf

Posted in Oil Sands | 1 Comment

What’s Really Behind the Decline in Belief in Climate Science: It’s the Economy

Posted on September 21, 2011 by admin

What’s Really Behind the Decline in Belief in Climate Science: It’s the Economy
Lisa Danielson and George Hoberg
September 21, 2011

There is widespread evidence that the American public’s belief in climate change is declining. The existence, immediacy and seriousness of climate change have all been called into question, with a Gallup poll in 2010 showing that only 50% of Americans surveyed believe that humans are affecting climate change, opposed to 61% in 2007.

This decline plays a crucial role in how governments react to climate change, as elected politicians care about what people think. If public opinion is showing a trend towards a disbelief in climate science, this could be an important factor in discouraging political action. A recent paper, “Fair Weather Friends,” by Lyle Scruggs and Salil Benegal from the University of Connecticut’s Department of Political Science, tries to tease out an explanation for these trends.

The authors identify three competing explanations for this decline: media and conservative counter-mobilization, weather anomalies, and the economic recession. While all these factors have an affect on how the public perceives climate change, their analysis concludes that the state of the economy is the cause that has the most weight in shifting public opinion.

1. Media and Conservative Counter-Mobilization

Scruggs and Benegal provide a detailed examination of how media bias influences climate coverage, and the concerted campaign by conservatives to discredit climate science. They review arguments that the media’s tendency to report opposing views on an issue has the consequence of misrepresenting the pervasive consensus on climate science. But they note that loudly voiced views that attack climate science started in the early to mid 1990’s, while the public seemed to increasingly embrace climate science until 2007-2008.

They also focus on “climategate,” the notorious instance of hacked emails appearing to discredit climate science. There is a widespread belief that this faux scandal had damaging impacts on the public’s belief in climate science. But the paper examines the sequence of events and points out the revealing fact that the drop in belief in opinion polls ­preceded the November 2009 climategate incident. A widely report Pew poll shows a significant drop in an October 2009 survey.

2. Weather Anomalies

Several studies show that people tend to believe more in global warming if they think recent temperatures are higher than normal. Scruggs and Benegal analyze the data and show that it provides some support for trends in climate beliefs. However, local weather anomalies are linked with the likelihood that individuals express “pro-climate” opinions, and do not provide an adequate explanation for the size of the shift in public opinion.

3. Economic Conditions

There is considerable evidence that public support for the environment is inversely related to the health of the economy. This does not mean that environmental concerns are completely disregarded during recessions, but simply that there is a shift in priorities. According to the paper, the “Great Recession” is the biggest contributing factor to the shift in public opinion, and they use new survey evidence to map decline in concern with climate change to the economic recession. A summary graph of the results is provided below.

The three lines chart the response to the question “are we warming now” in three different surveys (Gallup, Pew and OSU/Stanford). Higher on the vertical axis represents a higher chance of answering “yes” while lower is the greater chance on answering “no.”

Scruggs and Benegal show that there is clear correlation between the economic indicators such the unemployment rate, and the priority given to climate change mitigation. This shows the profound impact of an economic crisis has on public support for a long-term problem such as climate change.

The authors conclude: “We evaluate over thirty years of public opinion data about global warming and the environment, and suggest that the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession.” For climate hawks, the good news is that belief in global warming and support for action may rebound when economic conditions improve. The bad news is that it is unlikely to happen before then, and more generally that support for climate action and other environmental initiatives is so vulnerable to fluctuations in economic conditions.

Resources from opinion polls

Gallup March 2011

Pew Center for the People and the Press. . “A Deeper Partisan Divide Over Global Warming.”  May 8, 2008

Pew Center for the People and the Press. “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming.” October 22, 2009

Pew Center for the People and the Press. Little Change in Opinions about Global Warming -Increasing Partisan Divide on Energy Policies. October 27, 2010.

Stanford University 2010. Majority of Americans Continue to Believe that Global Warming Is Real. March 9, 2010.

Stanford University. “Global Warming Poll: Selected results.” June 9, 2010

Posted in Climate Action Policy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Insights from new book: Why are so many potentially beneficial policy changes not adopted? The case of forest policy in Canada

Posted on September 20, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg

New book from Luckert, Haley and Hoberg

September 20, 2011

Policy analysts and advocates frequently are left scratching their heads when policy changes that seem self-evidently superior to the status quo are not adopted. Forest policies in Canada are a fascinating example. Implemented mostly in the mid-20th century, most forest policy analysts believe that the current system is now anachronistic and unable to meet the aspirations for sustainable forest management in the 21st century. This month, a new book on Canadian forest policy was released by UBC Press that explicitly makes this case: Policies for Sustainably Managing Canada’s Forests: Tenure, Stumpage Fees, and Forest Practices. The book was authored by two forest economists, Marty Luckert (University of Alberta) and David Haley (professor Emeritus from UBC), and a political scientist, me. We provide detailed comparisons of policies for tenure, stumpage, and forest practices across the Canadian provinces. It nests these comparisons within an analytical perspective of property rights theory and a concern for advancing sustainable forest management.

Barriers to Change

One set of insights emerging from the analysis is the barriers to innovative policy change. The book develops five categories of barriers to change:

  1. Intellectual barriers refer to the fact that even when there is widespread consensus on the failure of existing policies, there may actually be significant disagreements among analysts about what would constitute superior alternatives to the flawed status quo. These differences can arise because of value differences, where analysts put different weight on what the most important consequences of policy are (e.g., economic efficiency vs. environmental protection). They can also stem from significant uncertainties about the outcomes of alternative solutions to policy reform.
  2. Political opposition from those benefitting from the status quo can occur even if proposed changes are clearly in the public interest overall. Policy change inevitably alters the distribution of costs and benefits, so any meaningful policy change creates losers as well as winners. When these potential losers have substantial political power, they can be a formidable barrier to change.
  3. Decision rules that advantage opponents to change can also thwart policy changes. Rules that require government to compensate the forest industry for lost tenure rights, for example, can discourage change in some circumstances.
  4. Institutional mismatch occurs when there is an inconsistency between the jurisdiction promoting policy change and other governments. In Canadian forestry, for example, the provinces dominate forest policy, but the federal government has significant powers that it could exercise if it so chose. So a province’s efforts to embark on a significant change could be thwarted if the federal government disagreed.
  5. Path dependence refers to the phenomenon that “once a policy or institutional path is established, entrenched mindsets, interests, and institutions make departures from the status quo difficult to envision” (p. 170)

These five barriers to change have proven quite formidable in the case of Canadian forest policy, but are also an effective way to think about the challenges to adopting new policies in other fields as well.

The book is now available for purchase, and UBC Press has made the introductory chapter available on-line.

The cover photo is of Pemberton Valley, 170 km north of Vancouver, from the amazing Mark Richards in Whistler.

Posted in BC Forest Policy | Leave a comment

Optimizing your twitter feed for course websites

Posted on September 16, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg
September 16, 2011 – Update September 26

Note: after writing the initial version of this post, twitter changed it search parameters so that the code originally outlined did not do what it was  designed to do. We’ve revised the code so that it now works with the new search parameters.

I’ve been working on incorporating social media into my courses for the past several years. Here’s a description of what I’m doing this term in my sustainable forest policy class at UBC. I have a facebook page I try get students to “like” so they can share resources and ideas. I’ve been an active twitter user since 2009, and include a twitter feed on my course website. One of the issues I’ve confronted is limiting that feed to only those tweets most relevant to the course. I tweet on a lot on energy and climate issues, and politics, that are not directly relevant to the forest policy.

What I decided to do is have the feed show only tweets with the course-specific hashtag in it (in this case, #FRST415). That way I can control which of my tweets end up in the course feed, and students can get things in the feed as well by using that hashtag.

When we tried this, however, another dilemma came up. When my items with the course hashtag were retweeted, those would show up as well, creating a lot of redundancy. Our wonderful IT expert in Forestry, Renita Drakes, was able to redesign the search parameters in the twitter widget to exclude retweets of my items (although not those that others will post with the hashtag).

Here is how she has modified the code to create the feed I have on my website, shown here. We’re posting this in the event others might want to tailor this to their websites to avoid the same problems. Or if you have suggestions for improvement, please comment.

<!– START TWITTER CODE –>

<script src=”http://widgets.twimg.com/j/2/widget.js“></script>

<script>

new TWTR.Widget({

version: 2,

type: ‘search’,

search: ‘#frst415  -\”RT @ghoberg:\”‘,

interval: 10,

title: ‘Recent Tweets’,

subject: ‘Sustainable Forest Policy’,

width: 255,

height: 300,

theme: {

shell: {

background: ‘#74a0a3′,

color: ‘#ffffff’

},

tweets: {

background: ‘#ffffff’,

color: ‘#444444′,

links: ‘#74a0a3′

}

},

features: {

scrollbar: true,

loop: true,

live: true,

hashtags: true,

timestamp: true,

avatars: true,

toptweets: true,

behavior: ‘all’

}

}).render().start();

</script>

<!– END TWITTER CODE –>

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Between Consent and Accommodation: What is the Government Duty to Accommodate First Nations Concerns with Resource Development Projects?

Posted on August 23, 2011 by admin

George Hoberg and Stephanie Taylor
August 23, 2011

pdf of this post Between consent and accommodation

The relationship between Canadian governments and Aboriginal groups continues to shift as a result of political developments and new jurisprudence. The power of Aboriginal groups seems to continually increase. Indeed, it may now be the case that it is not politically possible for natural resource projects in Canada to proceed if there is significant opposition from affected First Nations. This brief examines this issue by considering current Canadian law.

The Prosperity Mine case in British Columbia was quite revealing. The proposed mine went through both the BC and Federal environmental assessment processes. There were significant environmental concerns with the proposal, and First Nations in the area were resolutely opposed. The BC government considered these objections and approved the project. But the Harper Government examined the same concerns and rejected the project, citing among other reasons the strong objections of local First Nations to the proposed use of a cherished lake as a tailings pond.  (The proposal has now been altered and it going through review again.)

The core uncertainty is whether governments have the legal authority to proceed with a project if affected First Nations are strongly opposed. The unfortunate answer is that there is no clear answer to this question, and that it depends on the specific situation of the Aboriginal claim, the nature of the proposed infringement, the actions of government to address Aboriginal concerns, and the viewpoint of the reviewing courts.

The UN Declaration’s provision for “free, prior and informed consent”

First Nations groups increasingly refer to the provision in United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that  says “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources” (Article 32.1). However, the UN Declaration is not legally binding on signatories. When it finally endorsed the Declaration in November 2010, the Government of Canada took pains to note that it objects to the provision of “free, prior and informed consent when used as a veto.”  In explaining why it would endorse the Declaration if it had these objections, the government stated: “We are now confident that Canada can interpret the principles expressed in the Declaration in a manner that is consistent with our Constitution and legal framework.”

What does Canada’s legal framework say about government duties in these situations? The best indication of this we have at present are the companion 2004 Supreme Court cases of Haida and Taku. The Haida case was foundational in extending the government’s duty to consult to include the need to accommodate Aboriginal concerns. But the Supreme Court made it clear at the same time that the obligation to accommodate “does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what can be done with land pending final proof of the claim.” The less celebrated Taku case elaborates on this distinction by upholding a case of government approval of a resource project despite the continued opposition from the affected First Nation.

The Taku Supreme Court decision case study

In the early 1990s, Redfern Resources sought provincial approval to re-open the Tulsequah Chief underground mine near Atlin in northern British Columbia. Redfern planned to construct a 160 km access road which fell within the traditional territory of the Taku River Tlinglit First Nation (Taku Tlinglit). As part of the environmental review process, stakeholders, including Redfern and the Taku Tlinglit, formed a Project Committee. Three and a half years later, the Project Committee submitted its recommendations to the responsible ministers within the provincial government. The Taku Tlinglit disagreed with these recommendations and submitted their own minority report to the responsible Ministers. After reviewing both reports, the government granted Redfern a Project Approval Certificate (PAC).

Following the issuance of the PAC, the Taku Tlinglit began legal proceedings to overturn the Ministers’ decision, stating that the construction of the access road would infringe upon their title and traditional usage rights within the area. Both the lower court and the Court of Appeal agreed with the Taku Tlinglit; the appellate court stated that the PAC had been issued without due consideration for the Crown’s fiduciary and constitutional obligations with respect to the Taku Tlinglit. The Court of Appeal then asked the responsible Ministers to reconsider their decision, taking into account their legal obligations to the First Nation.

The province appealed the court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). The SCC released their ruling on November 18, 2004, finding unanimously in favour of the provincial government. In their decision, the SCC determined that the strength of the Taku Tlinglit’s claim the disputed area was strong enough to require that the Crown consult and attempt to accommodate their concerns. The strength of the Taku Tlinglit’s claim was due in large part to the fact that the land was currently the subject of treaty negotiations between the First Nation and the province. The Court also stated that the construction of the access road would prove highly disruptive to the cultural, social, and economic activities undertaken by the Taku Tlinglit in the area.

Nevertheless, the SCC stated that the province had adequately discharged its duty to consult and accommodate. “Its views were put before the decision makers, and the final project approval contained measures designed to address both its immediate and its long-term concerns. The Province was not under a duty to reach agreement with the TRTFN, and its failure to do so did not breach the obligations of good faith that it owed the TRTFN.”

By fully involving the Taku Tlinglit in the Project Committee review process, the province’s consultation process was found to be sufficiently inclusive and thorough. The SCC further concluded that the concerns of the Taku Tlinglit were taken into account by Redfern during their information gathering and analytical activities. The majority report produced by the Project Committee also took note of and recommended measures to remedy the Taku Tlinglit’s complaints. The Court was satisfied that there was further room in the more specific permitting process to address concerns about inadequate baseline information and the specific course of the road, and that a joint management authority would be establish to govern the road.

Taku’s vague standard for accommodation

The Supreme Court’s Taku decision is the closest thing we have to an articulated standard of sufficient accommodation. That standard remains extremely vague. It suggests that good faith efforts to address Aboriginal concerns can be demonstrated to be sufficient accommodation. But the specific conditions to meet that test are left deliberately vague, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, not defined outright.

The Supreme Court concludes:

“Where consultation is meaningful, there is no ultimate duty to reach agreement. Rather, accommodation requires that Aboriginal concerns be balanced reasonably with the potential impact of the particular decision on those concerns and with competing societal concerns. Compromise is inherent to the reconciliation process. In this case, the Province accommodated TRTFN concerns by adapting the environmental assessment process and the requirements made of Redfern in order to gain project approval. I find, therefore, that the Province met the requirements of its duty toward the TRTFN.”

This standard is clearly quite a distance from the “free, prior and informed consent” of the UN Declaration. How far the Canadian governmental practice and jurisprudence have moved in that direction will only, it seems, be revealed through further decisions on resource authorizations and judicial review.

Additional Sources:

Blakes Bulletin on Litigation, http://www.blakes.com/english/legal_updates/litigation/nov_2004/Litigation-Haida-Nov2004.pdf

Mark Haddock, Comparison of the British Columbia and Federal Environmental Assessments for the Prosperity Mine, Northwest Institute for Bioregional Research, July 2011. http://northwestinstitute.ca/downloads/NWI_EAreport_July2011.pdf

Posted in Uncategorized | 5 Comments